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The Protection of Cultural Resources on Public Lands:
Federal Statutes and Regulations
by Sandra B. Zellmer
I. Introduction
The federal public lands—national forests, parks, and
rangelands—are widely known for their vast natural re-
sources: timber; range; minerals; watersheds; wildlife; and
sweeping vistas of incredible beauty and diversity. No less
notable are the cultural resources found on the public lands.
Some of the earliest withdrawals of public lands from
homesteading or other disposition occurred because of their
cultural and historic importance.1
Preserving and allowing access to resources with cul-
tural significance are critical to sustaining diverse, viable
communities as well as our national, collective heritage.
For American Indian people in particular, certain places,
physical features, and objects on the public lands hold
deep cultural and spiritual significance. Without ongoing
relationships with a defined physical “place,” the integrity
of many contemporary American Indian societies could
be jeopardized.2
This Article provides an assessment of federal law gov-
erning the management and preservation of cultural re-
sources on public lands, focusing on resources of interest to
American Indians. It reviews federal statutes and regula-
tions governing cultural and historic resource protection, as
well as laws applicable to specific categories of federal pub-
lic lands. In addition, it assesses the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA),3 an integral part of the decision-
making process for most activities on public lands, and its
use as a tool for protecting the resources and accommo-
dating their use.
The principal cultural resource statutes are the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)4; the Archaeological Re-
sources Protection Act (ARPA)5; and the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).6
These laws provide procedural mechanisms through which
interested parties can participate in decisionmaking pro-
cesses, as well as substantive protection for cultural and his-
toric resources. The NHPA requires federal agencies to en-
gage in consultation, often accomplished in conjunction
with the NEPA process, to take into account the effect of
federal undertakings on historic properties and traditional
cultural resources. ARPA prohibits the excavation or re-
moval of archaeological resources from federal lands with-
out a permit. The most recent addition to this trilogy of cul-
tural resource laws, NAGPRA, provides for the repatriation
of American Indian remains and cultural items imbedded in
federal and tribal lands. These statutes and their implement-
ing regulations provide significant roles for tribal govern-
ments, in recognition of their inherent sovereign interests in
tribal historic, cultural, and religious resources.7
The public lands statutes, the Federal Land Policy Man-
agement Act (FLPMA)8; the National Forest Management
Act (NFMA)9; and the National Park Service Organic Act,10
play an affirmative role in cultural resource management
and preservation by recognizing cultural values in land
management plans and by preventing the degradation of the
resources. The NFMA and FLPMA direct that multiple uses
be allowed on the public lands in a manner that can be sus-
tained over time. The National Park Service Organic Act
provides for conservation and public enjoyment of National
Park System lands and resources. Together with the cultural
resource statutes and NEPA, these laws encourage, and in
some cases may even mandate, federal accommodation of
cultural values of American Indian tribes.
The author is an Associate Professor, University of Toledo College of
Law. The author thanks the American Law Institute-American Bar Asso-
ciation for providing the opportunity to speak about cultural resources on
public lands at its environmental law conference in Washington, D.C., in
February 2001; Professor Dean Suagee for his insights on the National
Historic Preservation Act; and Brian Ferrell, Trial Attorney, U.S. De-
partment of Justice, for his encouragement and helpful comments on
drafts of this Article.
1. Six of the first nine national monuments to be designated under the
Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §431, were included in large part
for their historic and ethnological interest. Examples include the na-
tion’s first monument, Devils Tower, see Presidential Proclamation
No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1906) (describing the butte as “a natural
wonder and an object of historic and great scientific interest”); Bear
Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 816, 29 ELR
21083, 21084 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1530 (2000)
(discussed infra, at Section IV.C.), along with El Morro and Chaco
Canyon National Monuments, see Presidential Proclamation No.
695, 34 Stat. 3264 (1906) (noting “greatest historical [and archaeo-
logical] value” of El Morro’s rock carvings and ruins); Presidential
Proclamation No. 740, 35 Stat. 2119 (1907) (describing Chaco Can-
yon’s extraordinary “prehistoric communal or pueblo ruins”).
2. See Raymond Cross & Elizabeth Brenneman, Devils Tower at the
Crossroads: The National Park Service and the Preservation of Na-
tive American Cultural Resources in the 21st Century, 18 Pub.
Land & Resources L. Rev. 5, 45 (1997). See also Frank
Pommersheim, Braid of Feathers 33-35 (1995) (describing the
land as a “sacred text” that serves a “prophetic function in the life of
the [Lakota] community”).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370d, ELR Stat. NEPA §§2-209.
4. 16 U.S.C. §§470-470w-6.
5. Id. §§470aa-470ll.
6. 25 U.S.C. §§3001-3013.
7. For detailed treatment of cultural resource provisions applicable to
tribal lands, see Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic Preserva-
tion: Sacred Landscapes, Cross-Cultural Bridges, and Common
Ground, 21 Vt. L. Rev. 145 (1996); Dean B. Suagee, Cultural Re-
sources and Historic Preservation in Indian Country: An Outline of
Federal Law (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
8. 43 U.S.C. §§1701-1785, ELR Stat. FLPMA §§102-603.
9. 16 U.S.C. §§1600-1687, ELR Stat. NFMA §§2-16.
10. Id. §§1-4. Although provisions governing other types of public
lands may be relevant, see, e.g., National Wildlife Refuge System
Act, 16 U.S.C. §668dd, only the three major statutory regimes—the
NFMA, FLPMA and the National Park Service Organic Act—are
covered here.
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No discussion of cultural resource management on the
federal public lands would be complete without considering
the constitutional implications of decisions affecting cul-
tural resources, many of which hold spiritual or religious
significance. This Article provides a brief overview of the
First Amendment’s religion clauses, and concludes that, al-
though the Free Exercise Clause has not afforded concrete
protection for cultural and religious resources on public
lands, neither has the Establishment Clause prevented land
management agencies from accommodating interests in
such resources.11 Accommodation of American Indian in-
terests is consistent with the unique federal relationship with
tribes, as well as the policies expressed in the American In-
dian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA),12 and the Executive
Order on Sacred Sites, which directs agencies to accommo-
date the use of sacred sites and to avoid actions that ad-
versely affect their physical integrity.13 Moreover, the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),14 may prohibit
federal land managers from taking action that substantially
burdens religious interests absent compelling reasons.
II. Cultural Resource Protection Statutes
Congress has emphasized the importance of cultural re-
source protection: “The historical and cultural foundations
of the nation should be preserved as a living part of our com-
munity life and development in order to give a sense of ori-
entation to the American people.”15 This policy is effectu-
ated through three key statutes: the NHPA; ARPA; and
NAGPRA. The NHPA is predominately procedural in na-
ture, while ARPA and NAGPRA provide substantive rights
and liabilities.
A. The National Historic Preservation Act
1. The Scope of the NHPA’s Coverage
The NHPA expresses the “national policy to preserve for
public use historic sites, buildings, and objects of national
significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of
the United States.”16 It protects such properties through de-
tailed and rigorous consultation requirements for any fed-
eral undertaking affecting historic and cultural properties,
including properties of traditional cultural and religious im-
portance to American Indian tribes. The statute provides ad-
ditional protections for national historic landmarks.
The primary mechanism for the protection of historic and
cultural resources under the NHPA is procedural in nature.
Pursuant to NHPA §106, all federal agencies must consider
the effect of federal undertakings on districts, sites, struc-
tures, and objects included in or eligible for inclusion in the
National Register.17 The Secretary of the Interior, through
the National Park Service (NPS), is responsible for deter-
mining eligibility for the National Register.18 Public or pri-
vate property may be eligible if it meets the following Na-
tional Register criteria: (1) it is associated with events that
have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of
our history; (2) it is associated with the lives of persons sig-
nificant in our past; (3) it possesses high artistic values or
distinctive characteristics of a period, type, or method of
construction, or represents the work of a master; or (4) it
may yield important historical information.19
Properties that have achieved significance within the past
50 years are generally not eligible for the National Regis-
ter.20 Likewise, religious properties are not eligible unless
they “are integral parts of districts that do meet the criteria”
or derive their “primary significance from architectural or
artistic distinction or historical importance.”21 The 1992
NHPA amendments explicitly provide that “properties of
traditional religious and cultural importance” to American
Indian tribes may be eligible.22 Such properties are often re-
ferred to as “traditional cultural properties” (TCPs).
An NPS guidance document, Bulletin 38, Guidelines for
Evaluating and Documenting Traditional Cultural Prop-
erties, defines a TCP as a property “eligible for inclusion in
the National Register because of its association with cultural
practices or beliefs of a living community that (a) are rooted
in that community’s history, and (b) are important in main-
taining the continuing cultural identity of the community.”23
An undisturbed area of the natural world, such as a mountain
peak or butte like Devils Tower, Wyoming, may be a TCP.24
Accordingly, American Indian “sacred sites,” as that term is
used in Executive Order on Sacred Sites, may be TCPs.25
The inclusion of TCPs within the NHPA’s coverage has
triggered controversy both because of the potential geo-
graphic scope of the NHPA as it relates to TCPs, which can
encompass large areas of land, and because of the difficulty
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11. See section V, infra, for an analysis of the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses of the First Amendment as applied to sacred sites
and cultural items and practices on federal public lands. This topic is
the subject of a related article, currently in progress by the author.
12. 42 U.S.C. §1996.
13. Exec. Order No. 13007 §1(a), 61 Fed. Reg. 26771 (May 29, 1996).
14. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(1).
15. 16 U.S.C. §470(b)(2). Congress further provided that “the preserva-
tion of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so that its vi-
tal legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, eco-
nomic, and energy benefits will be maintained and enriched for fu-
ture generations of Americans.” Id. §470(b)(4).
16. Id. §461.
17. Id. §470f.
18. See id. §470a(1); 36 C.F.R. pt. 60.
19. 36 C.F.R. §60.4. Private landowners may opt out by objecting to a
proposal for inclusion of their property on the National Register. See
16 U.S.C. §470a(a)(6); 36 C.F.R. §60.6.
20. 36 C.F.R. §60.6.
21. Id.
22. 16 U.S.C. §470a(d)(6).
23. NPS, National Register Bulletin 38, Guidelines for Eval-
uating and Documenting Traditional Cultural Properties
1 (1990) [hereinafter Bulletin 38], available at http://www2.
cr.nps.gov/tribal/bull3803.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2001).
24. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 29 ELR
21083 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1530 (2000). See also
Suagee, Tribal Voices, supra note 7, at 172-74 (discussing Mount
Shasta and the Helkau Historic District of the Six Rivers National
Forest in northern California, both TCP’s); Pueblo of Sandia v.
United States, 50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995) (describing consultation
efforts regarding Las Huertas Canyon in the Cibola National Forest).
25. See Exec. Order No. 13007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26771 (May 29, 1996). The
order’s definition of “sacred site” is more limited:
[a]ny specific, discrete, narrowly delineated location on Fed-
eral land that is identified by an Indian tribe, or Indian indi-
vidual determined to be an appropriately authoritative repre-
sentative of an Indian religion, as sacred by virtue of its estab-
lished religious significance to, or ceremonial use by, an In-
dian religion; provided that the tribe or appropriately authori-
tative representative of an Indian religion has informed the
agency of the existence of such a site.
Id. §1(b)(iii).
in determining the location and eligibility of TCPs.26 Unlike
many other properties, there may be no distinguishing phys-
ical features of a site that characterize it as a TCP; “there
may be nothing observable to the outsider about a place re-
garded as sacred by a Native American group.”27 As a result,
fulfilling the §106 requirements for TCP’s can be a chal-
lenging duty for federal land managers.28
2. The Consultation Process
The consultation requirement for federal undertakings
sweeps quite broadly to include:
a project, activity, or program funded in whole or in part
under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of a Federal
agency, including:
(A) those carried out by or on behalf of the agency;
(B) thosecarriedoutwith federal financial assistance;
(C) those requiring a Federal permit, license, or ap-
proval; and
(D) those subject to State or local regulation ad-
ministered pursuant to a delegation or approval by a
Federal agency.29
A wide variety of actions have been found to be under-
takings for purposes of §106, including forest planning;
rulemaking; construction of dams, fences, and other
structures; land exchanges; lease approvals for mining on
Indian lands; and permits for activities on federal and pri-
vate lands.30 However, §106 may not be triggered if the
federal action is merely ministerial or authorizes inconse-
quential activities.31
If an undertaking is proposed, NHPA §106 provides that
the federal “action agency with direct or indirect jurisdiction
over a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking . . .
shall, . . . take into account the effect of the undertaking on
any district, site, building, structure, or object that is in-
cluded in or eligible for inclusion in the National Regis-
ter.”32 Thus, §106 does not force substantive outcomes.
When historic properties will be adversely affected by a fed-
eral undertaking, the consultation process is typically con-
cluded by a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), but the
undertaking may still go forward even without an MOA.33
The federal action agency has responsibility for effectuat-
ing each step of consultation and ensuring that the appropri-
ate entities are involved during the process. States play a key
role in the consultation process through their State Historic
Preservation Officers (SHPOs). SHPOs are directed to iden-
tify historic properties, evaluate their significance, and for-
mulate measures to protect properties deemed worthy of
protection.34 Within reservation boundaries, tribal govern-
ments and Tribal Historic Preservation Officers (THPOs)
may assume the functions that would otherwise be per-
formed by SHPOs.35
Action agencies must consult with SHPOs or THPOs on
undertakings that may affect historic properties.36 Action
agencies must also consult with interested tribes when an
undertaking may affect properties of “religious and cultural
significance,” even if the property is outside reservation
boundaries.37 The Advisory Council on Historic Preserva-
tion (the Council), an independent agency that administers
§106, has issued detailed regulations regarding the five
steps of consultation, as described below.38
a. Initiate Consultation and Coordinate With NEPA
The action agency must determine whether the proposed
federal action is an “undertaking” that has the potential to
affect historic properties and TCPs. If so, the agency must
identify the appropriate SHPO or THPO to be involved in
the consultation process. With respect to undertakings on
federal lands, the agency must also “make a reasonable and
good faith effort to identify any Indian tribes or Native Ha-
waiian organizations that might attach religious and cultural
significance to historic properties in the area of potential ef-
fects and invite them to be consulting parties.”39
The NHPA regulations encourage the action agency to
coordinate its §106 compliance with the preparation of any
necessary NEPA documents.40 Similarly, NEPA’s imple-
menting regulations provide that agencies must prepare en-
vironmental impact statements (EIS) concurrently and in an
integrated fashion with related studies required by other en-
vironmental laws.41 Historic and cultural resources are ex-
pressly included among the environmental consequences to
be considered in EIS.42
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26. In reaction to a controversy over a ski resort on Mount Shasta, Rep.
Wally Herger (R-Cal.) sponsored H.R. 563, providing that no prop-
erty can be determined eligible for the National Register unless it
contains physical evidence of human activity, such as artifacts. See
141 Cong. Rec. H325 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995). The Herger bill, had
it passed, would have rendered Mount Shasta and many other TCPs
ineligible for the National Register. See Suagee, Tribal Voices, supra
note 7, at 174.
27. Bulletin 38, supra note 23, at 11-12.
28. See, e.g., Pueblo of Sandia, 50 F.3d at 856 (finding that the Forest
Service had failed to make a reasonable effort to identify TCPs
within forest plan area).
29. 16 U.S.C. §470w(7).
30. See Suagee, Tribal Voices, supra note 7, at 188 (collecting cases).
31. See id. (citing cases).
32. 16 U.S.C. §470f.
33. See id. §470h-2(l).
34. Id. §470a(a)(b)(3)(I). See also 36 C.F.R. §61.4(b).
35. Id. §470a(d)(2). See also 36 C.F.R. §800.2(c).
36. 16 U.S.C. §470a(a)(b)(3)(I). Applicants for federal assistance or a
federal permit or license are also entitled to participate as consulting
parties. See 36 C.F.R. §800.2(c)(4).
37. 16 U.S.C. §470a(d)(6).
38. See id. §470i(a) (directing the establishment of the Council). The
Council has been in the process of amending its regulations for sev-
eral years. See 64 Fed. Reg. 27044 (May 18, 1999) (rule revising
NHPA regulations). See also 65 Fed. Reg. 42834 (July 11, 2000)
(reissuing revisions as a proposed rule). The final revised regula-
tions were issued on December 12, 2000, and became effective on
January 11, 2001. See 65 Fed. Reg. 77698 (Dec.12, 2000). Changes
are summarized at http://www.achp.gov/newsregs12-00.html (last
visited Mar. 21, 2001); however, the new regulations maintain “the
core elements of the Section 106 process.” Id. Unless otherwise
noted, all references in this Article are to the most current version
of the regulations.
39. 16 C.F.R. §800.3(f)(2). As proposed, the rules would have required
consultation with “traditional cultural authorities,” people recog-
nized by their communities as repositories of knowledge about tradi-
tional beliefs and practices. However, this requirement was elimi-
nated in response to objections from federal agencies regarding the
difficulty of identifying such authorities. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 27046.
40. 36 C.F.R. §800.8. See also NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C), ELR
Stat. NEPA §102(2)(C) (requiring consideration of the environ-
mental effects and alternatives of major federal actions).
41. See 40 C.F.R. §1502.25.
42. See id. §1502.16. For a detailed discussion of NEPA, see infra, sec-
tion III.
b. Identify Historic Properties
The action agency must consult with the SHPO to determine
the area of potential effects and review existing information
about the identity of historic properties in that area. The
agency must also seek information from consulting parties
and others, including Indian tribes, with regard to the iden-
tity of properties that may hold religious and cultural signifi-
cance for those tribes.43 The agency must make reasonable,
good-faith efforts to identify historic properties and TCP’s
by conducting background research, interviews, and field
surveys.44 Tribal oral tradition can also be used to establish
the location and significance of a place.45
Information regarding TCPs is often highly sensitive in
nature. Agencies engaged in the consultation process are re-
quired to seek the views of Indian tribes regarding their con-
fidentiality concerns.46 Information regarding the location,
character, or ownership of a historic resource may not be
disclosed if the agency and the NPS make a determination
that disclosure may cause a significant invasion of privacy,
risk of harm to the historic property, or inhibit the use of a
traditional religious site by practitioners.47
Once information about a historic property in the project
area comes to light, the action agency, in consultation with
the SHPO and with any tribe that might attach significance
to the property, must evaluate its significance and determine
whether it is eligible for the National Register by applying
the National Register criteria.48 If the agency and the
SHPO agree that a property is not eligible, it shall be con-
sidered not eligible.49 However, if the Council requests a
determination of eligibility, then the agency must seek a
formal determination from the NPS. A tribe that attaches
religious and cultural significance to a historic property lo-
cated off tribal lands may ask the Council to request a for-
mal determination.50
If the action agency determines that there are no historic
properties, or that there are historic properties but they will
not be affected, the agency provides documentation to the
SHPO and notice to other consulting parties. If neither the
SHPO nor the Council objects within 30 days, the agency’s
§106 responsibilities are fulfilled.51 If, however, either the
SHPO or the Council objects or the action agency deter-
mines that the undertaking will affect historic properties, the
consultation process must continue to determine the nature
of the effects.
c. Assess Adverse Effects
Using the criteria specified in the regulations, the action
agency must determine whether effects on historic proper-
ties will be adverse, in consultation with the SHPO and any
tribe that attaches significance to identified historic proper-
ties. An effect is adverse when it may “diminish the integrity
of the property’s location, . . . setting, . . . feeling, or associa-
tion.”52 Examples of adverse effects include physical de-
struction, the introduction of visual, audible, or atmospheric
elements that are out of character with the property, the
alteration of the property’s setting, and transferring the
property without adequate restrictions to ensure its long-
term preservation.53
If the agency proposes a finding of no adverse effect, no-
tice must be provided to all the consulting parties. If the con-
sulting parties agree with the agency’s determination, the
§106 process is concluded.54 On the other hand, if any con-
sulting party expresses disagreement with the finding
within 30 days, the action agency must either consult with
the party to resolve the disagreement or request that the
Council review the finding. The agency is also encouraged
to seek concurrence from any tribe that attaches religious
and cultural significance to identified historic properties,
whether or not such a tribe is a consulting party. If the tribe
objects to the finding, it can request the Council to review
the finding. If the Council reviews the finding and deter-
mines that the effect would be adverse, the process contin-
ues to the next step.55
d. Resolve Adverse Effects
The action agency must attempt to reach agreement with
other consulting parties in developing and evaluating alter-
natives to avoid, minimize, or mitigate adverse effects.56 Al-
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43. 36 C.F.R. §800.4(a)(4).
44. Id. §800.4(b). In Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856,
860-62 (10th Cir. 1995), the Tenth Circuit found that the Forest Ser-
vice had failed to make a reasonable effort to identify TCPs when it
ignored the guidelines of Bulletin 38 and sent only written inquiries
to tribal representatives in spite of receiving information indicating
that TCPs may be present in the affected area. See Muckleshoot In-
dian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 807-08, 29 ELR 21168,
21170-71 (9th Cir. 1999) (determining that the Forest Service had
properly referenced Bulletin 38 in identifying TCPs, but enjoining a
proposed land exchange due to the agency’s failure to characterize
effects as adverse and for NEPA violations).
45. See Pueblo of Sandia, 50 F.3d at 860-61; Hoonah Indian Ass’n v.
Morrison, 170 F.3d 1223, 29 ELR 21024 (9th Cir. 1999). In the
Hoonah case, the court considered tribal oral evidence, but ulti-
mately upheld the Forest Service’s determination that a route taken
by the survivors of a battle in 1804 was not eligible for the National
Register because there was “no physical marking, no documenta-
tion, and no well established tribal consensus, to establish exactly
what . . . paths the retreating Kiks.adi had taken . . . . That important
things happened in a general area is not enough to make the area a
‘site.’” Id. at 1231-32, 29 ELR at 21027.
46. 36 C.F.R. §800.11(c).
47. 16 U.S.C. §470w-3(a)(3).
48. 36 C.F.R. pt. 63. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text (de-
scribing eligibility criteria).
49. 36 C.F.R. §800.4(c)(2). See Hoonah, 170 F.3d at 1231, 29 ELR at
21027 (concluding that if the federal agency official and the SHPO
agree that a property is not eligible for the National Register, it is
not eligible).
50. 36 C.F.R. §800.4(c)(2). If the tribe subsequently fails to appeal the
NPS’ eligibility determination, it may be barred from bringing suit in
court for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Hoonah,
170 F.3d at 1231, 29 ELR at 21027.
51. 36 C.F.R. §800.4(d)(1).
52. Id. §800.5(a)(1).
53. See id. §800.5(b). See also Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 807-08, 29 ELR 21168, 21170-71 (9th Cir.
1999) (rejecting agency’s conclusion that photographing and map-
ping would mitigate adverse effects to significant features on prop-
erty to be transferred to a private party, given that the site would
likely be logged if it were transferred without “adequate restrictions
and conditions”); 36 C.F.R. §800.5(a)(2)(vii) (providing examples
of adverse effects, including “[t]ransfer . . . of property out of Federal
ownership or control without adequate and legally enforceable re-
strictions or conditions to ensure long-term preservation of the prop-
erty’s historic significance”).
54. See 36 C.F.R. §800.5(c).
55. See id. §800.5(d).
56. See id. §800.6(a). See also Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 177 F.3d at
807-08, 29 ELR at 21170-71.
though all of the parties participate in this step, in most cases
only the action agency and the SHPO must actually reach
agreement, as expressed in an MOA. The Council may
choose to participate on its own initiative or at the request of
the SHPO, tribe, or another consulting party.57 If the Coun-
cil does participate, then it must also be a signatory to the
MOA.58 If consultation does not result in an MOA, the
agency, the SHPO, or the Council may decide that further
consultation will not be productive, and the process con-
cludes with one final step.
e. Failure to Resolve Adverse Effects
When the action agency terminates consultation, it must ask
the Council to comment on the undertaking.59 If the SHPO
terminates consultation, the agency and the Council may
continue consultation and execute an MOA without the
SHPO’s involvement.60 In contrast, if a THPO terminates
consultation, the Council must provide comments on the un-
dertaking, and the agency official and the Council cannot
execute an MOA.61 In the absence of an MOA, the undertak-
ing may proceed, but only if the decision is made by the head
of the agency.62 The decision must explain the rationale for
the decision and provide evidence that the agency consid-
ered the Council’s comments.63
3. National Historic Landmarks
In contrast to §106, NHPA §110 provides that, if an under-
taking would adversely affect a national historic landmark,
the action agency must take steps to minimize harm to the
landmark “to the maximum extent possible.”64 Public or pri-
vate properties may be designated as landmarks if they
“possess exceptional value or quality in illustrating or inter-
preting the heritage of the United States in history, architec-
ture, archeology, engineering and culture and . . . a high de-
gree of integrity of location, design, setting, materials,
workmanship, feeling and association.”65 For example, the
Medicine Wheel in the Bighorn National Forest is a na-
tional landmark subject to a Programmatic Agreement and
Historic Preservation Plan, signed by the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice and consulting parties.66 The plan emphasizes tradi-
tional cultural values as the management directive for the
area, closes a nearby road, and requires information ex-
change and consultation before logging or other disruptive
activities go forward.67
Section 110 also imposes programmatic responsibilities
on federal agencies, directing them to establish a preserva-
tion program to ensure that historic properties under the
agency’s control are identified, evaluated, and nominated
to the National Register, and managed in a manner that
considers their “historic, archaeological, architectural, and
cultural values.”68 In addition, §110 provides that the ac-
tion agency’s own procedures for implementing the
NHPA’s requirements must be consistent with the Coun-
cil’s regulations, and must provide for the disposition of
“cultural items” covered by NAGPRA in accordance with
that statute.69
4. Enforcement
Federal agencies that fail to execute their NHPA responsi-
bilities, along with their permittees, may be enjoined from
proceeding with the undertaking in question.70 Further, an
applicant or permittee who has intentionally caused signifi-
cant adverse effects to a historic property may be barred
from receiving loans, permits, licenses, or other assistance,
although the assistance may be granted if it is “nevertheless
justified.”71 The agency must “take into account the effects
of the undertaking” on the property, and consider the Coun-
cil’s opinion as to the justification for granting assistance
and the availability of any possible mitigation measures.72
Factors to be considered include the circumstances under
which the adverse effects occurred and the degree of dam-
age to the property.73
B. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act
ARPA applies to archaeological resources imbedded in, or
removed from, federal public lands and Indian lands.74 For
the purposes of ARPA, “public lands” include lands within
the National Park System, the National Wildlife Refuge
System, and the National Forest System, as well as most
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57. 36 C.F.R. §800.6(a)(1), 800.9(a). The Council is likely to enter the
process when an undertaking presents issues of concern to Indian
tribes. Id. pt. 800, app. A(c)(4).
58. Id. §800.6(c)(1). In addition, the agency official may invite a con-
cerned tribe to be a signatory if the MOA encompasses TCPs on fed-
eral lands. Id. §800.6(c)(2).
59. Id. §800.7.
60. Id. §800.7(a)(2).
61. Id. §800.7(a)(3).
62. 16 U.S.C. §470h-2(l). See 36 C.F.R. §800.7(c)(4).
63. 36 C.F.R. §800.7(c)(4).
64. 16 U.S.C. §470h-2(f). See 36 C.F.R. §800.10.
65. 36 C.F.R. §65.4(a). Additional criteria listed in the regulations in-
clude consideration of sites “composed of integral parts of the envi-
ronment not sufficiently significant by reason of historical associa-
tion or artistic merit to warrant individual recognition but [that] out-
standingly commemorate or illustrate a way of life or culture.” Id.
§65.4(a)(5).
66. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Forest Service Region 2, Historic Pres-
ervation Plan for the Medicine Wheel National Historic
Landmark and Vicinity (1996), signed by Forest Supervisor
Larry Keown, the Council, the SHPO, the Medicine Wheel Alliance,
the Medicine Wheel Coalition for Sacred Sites, the Federal Avia-
tion Administration, and Big Horn County Commissioners (on file
with author).
67. Id. The plan is intended to promote continued traditional cultural
uses and protect the area from inconsistent uses. Id. See infra notes
188-91, discussing pending litigation over the plan.
68. 16 U.S.C. §470h-2(a). See also NPS, The Secretary of the Interior’s
Standards and Guidelines for Federal Agency Historic Preservation
Programs Pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act, 63
Fed. Reg. 20496 (Apr. 24, 1998).
69. 16 U.S.C. §470h-2.
70. See Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856, 862 (10th Cir.
1995); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800,
808, 29 ELR 21168, 21171 (9th Cir. 1999).
71. 16 U.S.C. §470h-2(k).
72. 36 C.F.R. §800.9(c).
73. Id. The agency must provide documentation of these factors to the
Council, along with any comments received from the applicant, the
SHPO, Indian tribes, and other interested parties. Id.
74. See 16 U.S.C. §470ee. ARPA complements its predecessor, the An-
tiquities Act of 1906, which prohibits the appropriation, excavation,
or destruction of historic ruins, monuments, or “any object of antiq-
uity” situated on federal lands. See id. §433.
other lands for which fee title is held by the United States.75
The term “archaeological resource” is defined as “any
material remains of past human life or activities which are
of archaeological interest.”76 The statutory definition ex-
pressly includes graves and human skeletal remains. How-
ever, to be covered, items and remains must be at least 100
years of age.77
Under ARPA, the excavation, removal, alteration, or de-
struction of archaeological resources on federal, public, or
tribal lands is prohibited unless it occurs pursuant to a per-
mit.78 ARPA also prohibits the sale, purchase, transport, or
receipt of any archaeological resource excavated or re-
moved from federal or tribal lands in violation of ARPA or,
if the act took place in interstate or foreign commerce, in vi-
olation of state or local law.79
Permits may be obtained pursuant to uniform regulations
issued jointly by the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture,
and Defense, and the Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority.80 Prior to granting a permit, the land manager must
contact all Indian tribes with historic ties to the federal
lands at issue in order to identify sites of religious or cultural
importance.81 If the activity may result in harm to any such
site, the land manager must provide notice to interested
tribes and allow 30 days for a response.82 Upon request, the
land manager may meet with tribal representatives to dis-
cuss their interests, including ways to mitigate harm to the
site.83 Permits must include any mitigation measures that
are adopted.84
Violations of ARPA are subject to civil and criminal pen-
alties. Civil penalties may be assessed by the federal land
manager in an amount that reflects restoration costs and the
fair market value of lost or destroyed resources.85 Persons
who knowingly violate ARPA may be subject to imprison-
ment.86 Archaeological resources taken in violation of
ARPA, along with vehicles and equipment used in connec-
tion with such violation, are subject to forfeiture to the
United States.87 ARPA also provides for a bounty of up to
$500 for persons providing information leading to a convic-
tion or the assessment of a civil penalty.88
C. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act
NAGPRA was enacted in 1990 to correct decades of abu-
sive treatment of American Indian remains and burial
grounds.89 It complements ARPA by regulating the discov-
ery and removal of human remains and cultural items from
federal and tribal lands, but it goes beyond ARPA by requir-
ing repatriation to lineal descendants or appropriate tribes.
NAGPRA also requires federal agencies and museums to
inventory their collections and repatriate all remains and
cultural items covered by the Act.
1. The Scope of NAGPRA’s Coverage
NAGPRA establishes rights of federally recognized tribes,
Alaskan Native villages, and Native Hawaiian organiza-
tions to obtain repatriation of human remains and cultural
items.90 The provisions applicable to museums extend to
collections held by federal, state, and local governments and
public and private educational institutions that receive fed-
eral funds.91 Native American human remains and cultural
items embedded in federal public lands and tribal lands
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75. Id. §470bb(3). Lands on the Outer Continental Shelf and lands under
the jurisdiction of the Smithsonian Institution are excluded from the
term “public lands.” Id. §470bb(3)(b).
76. Id. §470bb. See also 43 C.F.R. §7.3(a) (providing detailed regulatory
definitions of statutory terms).
77. 16 U.S.C. §470bb(1).
78. Id. §470ee. ARPA exempts Indian tribes from the permit require-
ment for excavations on tribal lands, and also exempts any tribal
member if the tribe has a law regulating the excavation or removal of
archaeological resources. See id. §470cc(g).
79. Id. §470ee(c).
80. See 18 C.F.R. pt. 1312 (Tennessee Valley Authority); 32 C.F.R. pt.
229 (Defense); 36 C.F.R. pt. 296 (Agriculture - Forest Service); and
43 C.F.R. pt. 7 (the Interior).
81. 43 C.F.R. §7.7(b).
82. Id. §7.7(a).
83. Id. §7.7(a)(3). If it is necessary to issue a permit immediately due to
imminent threat of loss or destruction of the resource, the land man-
ager must provide notification to the appropriate tribe. Id. §7.7(a)(4).
84. Id. §7.7(a)(3).
85. See 16 U.S.C. §470ff(a) (authorizing civil penalties). See also 43
C.F.R. §§8365.1-5, 8360.0-7 (BLM authority to assess penalties); 36
C.F.R. §296.16 (Forest Service authority to assess penalties). Civil
penalties can be quite severe. See Sean Whaley, Man Fined $2.5 Mil-
lion, Las Vegas Rev.-J., Apr. 20, 1996, at 1B; Notice of Assess-
ment from Ann J. Morgan, BLM State Director, to Jack Lee
Harelson (Sept. 3, 1996) (on file with author).
86. See 16 U.S.C. §470dd(d) (providing that violators shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than one year; penalties
and confinement may be increased if the value of the resource or cost
of restoration exceed $500, or if the violator is a repeat offender). Of-
fenders may also be charged with theft of government property and
malicious mischief, see 18 U.S.C. §§641, 1361, and violation of the
Antiquities Act of 1906, which provides for a $500 penalty and 90
days’ imprisonment for the appropriation, excavation, or destruction
of historic ruins, monuments or “any object of antiquity” situated on
federal lands. See 16 U.S.C. §433. The circuit courts are split as to
whether the Antiquities Act, which does not define the term “object
of antiquity,” is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Compare United States v. Diaz,
499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding statute fatally vague) with
United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir.) (disagreeing with
Diaz and affirming conviction for taking artifacts), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 843 (1979). ARPA prosecutions have withstood vagueness
challenges. See United States v. Austin, 902 F.2d 743 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 874 (1990).
87. 16 U.S.C. §470gg(b)-(c). If the resources were taken from Indian
lands, penalties and forfeited items may be transferred to the affected
Indian tribe. Id.
88. Id. §470gg(a).
89. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-877, at 9 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4368; Wendy Crowther, Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: How Kennewick Man Un-
covered the Problems in NAGPRA, 20 J. Land Resources &
Envtl. L. 269, 270 (2000); Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk,
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act:
Background and Legislative History, 24 Ariz. St. L.J. 35 (1992).
90. See 25 U.S.C. §§3002-3003. The term “Native American” is defined
as “relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the
United States.” 26 U.S.C. §3001(9). The term “tribe” includes “any
tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indi-
ans, including any Alaska Native village . . . which is recognized as
eligible for the special programs and services provided by the
United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.” Id.
§3001(7). “Native Hawaiian” means “any individual who is a de-
scendant of the aboriginal people who, prior to 1778, occupied and
exercised sovereignty in the area that now constitutes the State of
Hawaii.” Id. §3001(10). The term Native American, as used
throughout this section of the Article, includes all persons and tribes
covered by NAGPRA.
91. See 25 U.S.C. §3001(8). Repatriation from museum and agency col-
lections is beyond the scope of this Article. For relevant provisions,
see id. §§3003-3005 (repatriation requirements), and 43 C.F.R.
§10.12 (civil penalty provisions).
are also covered by NAGPRA.92 Federal lands include
“any land other than tribal lands which are controlled or
owned by the United States, including lands selected by but
not yet conveyed to Alaska Native Corporations and
groups organized pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act of 1971.”93 Tribal lands include privately
owned lands within reservation boundaries and depend-
ent Indian communities.94
As defined in NAGPRA, “cultural items” include human
remains as well as funerary objects, sacred objects, and ob-
jects of cultural patrimony.95 Funerary objects are those
that were placed with human remains as part of a death rite
or ceremony.96 Sacred objects are “specific ceremonial ob-
jects which are needed by traditional Native American reli-
gious leaders for the practice of traditional Native Ameri-
can religions by their present day adherents.”97 Objects of
“cultural patrimony” include “object[s] having ongoing
historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the
Native American group or culture itself . . . which, there-
fore, cannot be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by
any individual.”98
The term “remains” is not defined in NAGPRA. Al-
though one federal district court has held that NAGPRA
does not apply to the corpse of a recently buried tribal mem-
ber because the corpse lacked cultural or archaeological in-
terest,99 its interpretation of the statute contradicts both the
plain language and remedial purposes of the Act.100 A more
plausible construction was rendered by a district court in
South Dakota, which specifically rejected arguments that
NAGPRA applies only to prehistoric human remains.101
The court reasoned that such an interpretation would render
NAGPRA’s priority for lineal descendants of human re-
mains “meaningless, since it is nearly, if not completely, im-
possible to determine the lineal descendants of persons who
died before recorded time.”102
2. Protection and Disposition of Cultural Items on Federal
and Tribal Lands
The excavation or removal of Native American human re-
mains and cultural items from federal or tribal lands is pro-
hibited unless a permit has been issued by the federal land
manager under ARPA.103 Before a permit will be issued, no-
tice and consultation with culturally affiliated tribes are re-
quired.104 Although tribal consent is not required for the is-
suance of a permit, culturally affiliated tribes have the right
to determine the disposition of excavated human remains or
cultural items.105
If Native American human remains or cultural items are
discovered on federal or tribal lands, the person making
such a discovery must notify the responsible federal or tribal
official.106 When remains are found on federal lands, the
agency official is required to provide notice to the appropri-
ate tribe. Meanwhile, the activity that led to the discovery
must cease.107 The activity may be resumed 30 days after
certification that notice has been received, but an ARPA per-
mit is required if the activity would result in the excavation
or removal of human remains or cultural items.108
Native American human remains and cultural items that
are excavated or removed from federal lands or tribal lands
are subject to rights of ownership or control according to the
priorities established in NAGPRA.109 Lineal descendants
have the highest priority with regard to human remains and
associated funerary objects. If lineal descendants cannot be
ascertained, and for unassociated funerary objects, sacred
objects, and objects of cultural patrimony, discovered on
tribal lands, the tribe on whose lands they were discovered
has the right of ownership or control. Otherwise, if the dis-
covery took place on federal lands, the tribe with the closest
cultural affiliation has the right of ownership and control.
However, if the Indian Claims Commission or Court of
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92. See 25 U.S.C. §3002. See also 60 Fed. Reg. 62134 (Dec. 4, 1995)
(codified at 43 C.F.R. part 10); 62 Fed. Reg. 41292 (Aug. 1, 1997)
(correcting amendments).
93. 25 U.S.C. §3001(5). See 43 C.F.R. §10.2(f)(1).
94. 25 U.S.C. §3002. See id. §3001(15); 43 C.F.R. §10.2(f)(2) (defining
tribal lands).
95. 25 U.S.C. §3001(3).
96. Id. §3001(3)(A)-(B). Funerary objects are further categorized into
“associated funerary objects,” where “both the human remains and
associated funerary objects are presently in the possession or control
of a Federal agency or museum” or were “exclusively made for
burial purposes or to contain human remains,” and “unassociated fu-
nerary objects.” Id.
97. Id. §3001(3)(C).
98. Id. §3001(3)(D). In City of Providence v. Babbitt (D.R.I. 1996) (No.
96-668) (on file with author), a museum sought a declaratory judg-
ment regarding a Hawaiian spear rest characterized by Hawaiian
groups as both an object of cultural patrimony and a sacred object.
The city claimed that the object was merely decorative, and that it
had a right of possession, having obtained it lawfully from an indi-
vidual with a right to alienate it. Id. §§3005(c), 3001(13). The
NAGPRA Review Committee recommended its return, see Isaac
Moriwake, Critical Excavations: Law, Narrative, and the Debate on
Native American and Hawaiian “Cultural Property” Repatriation,
20 U. Haw. L. Rev. 261, 265 (1998), and the case was ultimately
settled upon return of the object to the Hawaiians. See C.J. Chivers,
An Intense Aloha: City of Providence Bids Farewell to Disputed Ha-
waiian Artifact, Providence J., Aug. 8, 1998, at B1.
99. See Kickapoo Traditional Tribe of Tex. v. Chacon, 46 F. Supp. 2d
644, 650 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (referring to ARPA, which is limited to
“material remains of past human life . . . which are of archeological
interest,” 16 U.S.C. §470bb(1), to justify a restrictive construction of
“human remains” under NAGPRA). The court allowed Texas offi-
cials to exhume the body, which had been buried on tribal land, and
perform an autopsy, rejecting both NAGPRA and constitutional
claims. See id. at 653 (holding that criminal laws of “general applica-
bility” had a rational basis and therefore did not violate the First
Amendment, citing Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources
of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
100. See Crowther, supra note 89, at 270 (describing remedial purposes
of NAGPRA as correcting a long history of abusive treatment of Na-
tive American remains). Notably, some of the most egregious abuses
occurred immediately after a corpse was buried, when physical an-
thropologists collected and studied crania and other body parts in an
effort to prove that Indians were biologically inferior to Caucasians.
See Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 89, at 40 (describing aggres-
sive collection practices, such as taking skulls from battlefields, hos-
pitals, and grave sites).
101. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Corps of Eng’rs, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D.S.D.
2000).
102. Id. at 1055.
103. 25 U.S.C. §3002(c); 16 U.S.C. §470cc. This provision applies to dis-
coveries after November 16, 1990, the effective date of NAGPRA.
Id. §3002(a).
104. The term “cultural affiliation” is defined as “a relationship of shared
group identity which can be reasonably traced historically or prehis-
torically between a present day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian or-
ganization and an identifiable earlier group.” Id. §3001(2).
105. See 43 C.F.R. §§10.3, 10.5.
106. See 25 U.S.C. §3002(d); 43 C.F.R. §10.4.
107. 25 U.S.C. §3002(d).
108. 43 C.F.R. §10.4(d)(v), (e)(iii).
109. 25 U.S.C. §3002. See 43 C.F.R. §10.6.
Claims has determined that the federal lands at issue are the
aboriginal lands of a tribe, that tribe has a presumptive right
of ownership or control unless another tribe makes a stron-
ger showing of cultural affiliation.110
Failure to comply with the inadvertent discovery provi-
sions of NAGPRA may result in civil and criminal penal-
ties. In United States v. Tidwell,111 the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the conviction of Rodney Tidwell on a number of counts, in-
cluding trafficking in cultural items in violation of
NAGPRA, theft of tribal property, unlawful removal of ar-
chaeological resources, interstate transportation of stolen
property, and conspiracy.112 In defense, Tidwell argued that
the term “cultural patrimony” was unconstitutionally vague
in violation of the Due Process Clause,113 in that it failed to
give him fair notice that his conduct was prohibited, because
whether an item is “inalienable” and has “ongoing histori-
cal, traditional, or cultural importance” can only be deter-
mined by reference to unwritten tribal law. The court re-
jected these arguments, concluding that Tidwell was on no-
tice that the items he traded might be covered, as he held
himself out as a dealer in Native American art. Further,
Tidwell had previously been convicted of violating
NAGPRA, and therefore had personal knowledge of the
statute’s requirements.114
NAGPRA also allows certain private enforcement ac-
tions. Section 15 provides that the federal district courts
“shall have jurisdiction over any action brought by any
person alleging a violation of this Act and shall have the
authority to issue such orders as may be necessary to en-
force the provisions of this Act.”115 According to the U.S.
Department of the Interior (DOI), this authorizes civil ac-
tions against federal agencies to compel compliance with
the statute.116
3. Recent Disputes Calling the Act’s Scope and
Constitutionality Into Question
NAGPRA’s requirements for inadvertent discoveries of hu-
man remains are being tested in several pending cases, high-
lighting the Act’s practical and perhaps even constitutional
vulnerabilities.
a. Unidentifiable, Ancient Remains: Kennewick Man
A significant “loophole” in NAGPRA came to the forefront
in 1996, when human remains believed to be over 9,000
years old were discovered in the bank of the Columbia River
near Kennewick, Washington. At the time of NAGPRA’s
enactment, Congress was well aware of the tension between
the scientific desire for further study of ancient remains and
the objectives of the tribes, but it failed to resolve the issue
of ownership or control of remains whose cultural affiliation
could not be determined.117 Instead, the task was delegated
to the DOI to resolve through rulemaking, but regulations
have not yet been issued.118
Scientists raised both constitutional and statutory chal-
lenges to the decision of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(the Corps) to transfer the Kennewick remains to Indian
tribes for reburial.119 With respect to the constitutional issue,
the court determined, as a preliminary matter, that
NAGPRA had not been shown to violate equal protection
requirements because Congress could have reasonably con-
cluded that state and local laws against abusing a corpse and
grave-robbing were adequate for most cemeteries, but that
special measures were required for the unique problem of
the desecration of Native American remains.120 Moreover, it
found that Congress has a direct interest in regulating the
disposition of remains discovered on federal lands,121 and a
special obligation toward Native Americans.122
The court did, however, find that the Corps’ decision to
repatriate was arbitrary, in that the agency had neither con-
sidered all of the relevant facts regarding the discovery nor
articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action.123 It re-
manded the case to the Corps, and ordered it to retain cus-
tody of the remains and store them in a manner that would
preserve their potential scientific value. The plaintiffs’ re-
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110. 25 U.S.C. §3002(a)(2)(C).
111. 191 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 1999).
112. Id. The items at issue included Hopi masks and a set of priest robes
from the Pueblo of Acoma. Id. at 979. Tidwell was convicted of sev-
eral other crimes, including one count of trafficking in unlawfully re-
moved archaeological resources under ARPA, 16 U.S.C. §470ee.
113. Tidwell, 191 F.3d at 979-80.
114. Id. at 980 (citing United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 28 ELR
20125 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1133 (1998)).
“NAGPRA requires the government to establish that the defendant
‘knowingly’ traded in cultural items in violation of the NAGPRA.
This scienter element protects the unwary from criminal punish-
ment.” Id.
115. 25 U.S.C. §3013.
116. 62 Fed. Reg. 1820 (Jan. 13, 1997).
117. See Crowther, supra note 89, at 271 (citing Hearings on S. 1980 Be-
fore the Senate Select Commission on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong. 70
(1990) (statement of Prof. Keith Kintigh)). For discussion of the sci-
entific need for further study and suggestions for a resolution, see
Renee M. Kosslak, The Native American Graves Protection and Re-
patriation Act: The Death Knell for Scientific Study?, 24 Am. In-
dian L. Rev. 129 (2000).
118. The issue had come up at least once before, and in Na Iwi O Na
Kupuna O Mokapu v. Dalton, 894 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Haw. 1995), ex-
aminations were allowed to identify the cultural affiliation of re-
mains. However, that case involved an inventory conducted under
§3003(b)(2), which prevents agencies and museums from conduct-
ing additional research after completion of the initial inventory but
does not preclude further scientific study if necessary to conduct the
inventory in an accurate fashion. See 894 F. Supp. at 1417; 25 U.S.C.
§3005(b) (“agency or museum shall expeditiously return such items
unless such items are indispensable for completion of a specific sci-
entific study, the outcome of which would be of major benefit to the
United States”). In contrast, §3002 says nothing about research or
studies upon inadvertent discovery. Id. §3002.
119. See Bonnichsen v. Department of the Army, 969 F. Supp. 628 (D. Or.
1997). The Nez Perce Tribe and the Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation participated in the case as amicus cu-
riae. Id.
120. Id. Equal protection requires that similarly situated parties be treated
in similar fashion, and forbids decisions based on “race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification.” See United States v. Armstrong, 517
U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
121. Bonnichsen, 969 F. Supp. at 649. See U.S. Const. art. IV, §3, cl. 2
(providing that “Congress shall have power to dispose of the territo-
ries and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the terri-
tory or other property belonging to the United States”).
122. Bonnichsen, 969 F. Supp. at 649 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
551, 554-55 (1974)). Although the court noted that it was addressing
the issue at a preliminary stage of the case, it indicated that the plain-
tiffs would have a long way to go to convince the court otherwise in
subsequent proceedings. Id. See also Idrogo v. Department of the
Army, 18 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1998) (dismissing equal protection
claim brought by non-Indians to compel repatriation of the remains
of Geronimo for lack of standing, finding that only direct descen-
dants of Native American remains and affiliated tribes stand to be in-
jured by NAGPRA violations).
123. Bonnichsen, 969 F. Supp. at 646.
quest to study the remains was denied pending completion
of the Corps’ investigation.124 The DOI ultimately con-
cluded that the remains were culturally affiliated with five
Northwest tribes because the bones were found near the
tribes’ aboriginal lands, according to geographic data and
the tribes’ oral histories.125
Meanwhile, the NAGPRA Review Committee published
a notice in the Federal Register calling upon the Secretary of
the Interior to propose rules for the disposition of culturally
unidentifiable human remains. The committee provided
recommendations for a general approach, including the re-
turn, where appropriate, of remains recovered from tribal
and aboriginal lands and of remains “for which there is a re-
lationship of shared group identity with non-federally rec-
ognized Native American groups.”126 The committee also
noted that consultations might lead to regional
decisionmaking frameworks for the disposition of unidenti-
fiable remains, and that its recommendations could be
sought in individual cases.127
b. Ongoing Duties to Protect Cultural Items: Missouri
River
In December 1999, the Corps drew down the water level in
Lake Francis Case pursuant to its annual operating plan for
the reservoir, resulting in the exposure of Native American
remains and artifacts from the White Swan Burial Grounds,
also known as St. Phillip’s Cemetery.128 The cemetery had
been used by members of the Yankton Sioux Tribe since at
least the 19th century. The land on which the cemetery was
located was acquired by the federal government in the early
1950s to construct the Fort Randall Dam, and it is now sub-
merged for part of each year by the reservoir.129
The Yankton Sioux Tribe filed suit, seeking a preliminary
injunction against the Corps. The district court ruled that the
exposure of human remains through the lowering of the lake
level was an inadvertent discovery of remains subject to
NAGPRA.130 The court directed the Corps to remove all the
loose human remains in order to protect them from flooding,
and prohibited the Corps from raising the lake level until the
later of two dates: (1) the expiration of the statutory 30-day
period after certification of notice of the inadvertent discov-
ery; or (2) the date by which all loose human remains and
cultural items have been removed.131 The court suggested
that the Corps and the tribe might reach an agreement by
which tribal members could gather the loose human remains
and maintain custody of them pending disposition in accor-
dance with NAGPRA.132
With respect to human remains and cultural items that
could not be safely removed from the frozen ground, the
court allowed the Corps to raise the level of the lake in ac-
cordance with its operating plan (after the loose remains had
been removed), thereby covering the embedded remains
and items with at least 10 feet of water. However, it specified
that, before the annual draw-down in fall 2000, the Corps
and the tribe should prepare for the full recovery of the em-
bedded remains and cultural items.133 Subsequently, a sec-
ond lawsuit was brought against the Corps by the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe for the protection of burial sites on Lake
Oahe, another reservoir on the Missouri River.134 The court
entered a temporary restraining order against the Corps, re-
quiring the Corps to maintain water levels at Lake Oahe to
prevent disturbances to the burial sites, and negotiations
are ongoing.135
These two cases are notable for imposing ongoing duties
on the federal land manager upon discovery of human re-
mains and cultural items. It appears that the Corps could
have anticipated these issues, and perhaps minimized the
impact on its operations, had it fully implemented a 1994
programmatic agreement under the NHPA for the manage-
ment of the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoirs. However,
the Corps contends that it has insufficient staff and funding
to comply with its terms.136
III. NEPA and Executive Orders on Environmental
Justice and Sacred Sites
Federal decisions regarding cultural resources on public
lands often require environmental analysis pursuant to
NEPA. Like NHPA §106, NEPA is wholly procedural in na-
ture.137 NEPA ensures that federal agencies “look before
they leap” by considering the effects of major federal ac-
tions on the human environment, along with a range of rea-
sonably available alternatives to the proposed action. Al-
though the statute does not require the agency to choose the
least environmentally degrading alternative,138 NEPA’s pol-
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124. Id. at 646.
125. See Aviva L. Brandt, Judge Reactivates “Kennewick Man” Case,
Columbian, Oct. 26, 2000, at C2. Trial is set for June 2001. Id.
126. See 65 Fed. Reg. 36462, 36463 (June 8, 2000).
127. Id.
128. See Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Corps of Eng’rs, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1047
(D.S.D. 2000); Kay Humphrey, South Dakota Indian Tribe Sues to
Protect Ancestral Lands, Burial Grounds, Knight-Ridder Trib.
Bus. News: Indian Country Today, Oct. 30, 2000.
129. See Yankton Sioux Tribe, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1049. The Corps adjusts
lake levels for multiple purposes pursuant to the Flood Control Act
of 1944, including flood control, irrigation and power, as well as nav-
igation and recreation on the Missouri River. Id. at 1050.
130. Id. at 1056.
131. Id. at 1059. The court noted that the Corps must make reasonable ef-
forts to protect the remains, 25 U.S.C. §3002(d)(1); 43 C.F.R.
§10.4(d)(1)(ii), and that it must consult with tribes and develop a
written plan of action in the course of obtaining a permit to remove
the remains, 43 C.F.R. §10.4(d)(1)(v). See 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.
132. Id. at 1059.
133. Id. at 1060.
134. See Kay Humphrey, Indian Lawsuits Force Army Engineers to Reg-
ulate Level of South Dakota Lake, Knight-Ridder Trib. Bus.
News: Indian Country Today, Nov. 12, 2000.
135. Id. See Trial Postponed in Lawsuit Over Indian Graves, Minn.
Star-Trib., Nov. 30, 2000, at 30A.
136. See South Dakota: Drawdown of Francis Case Reservoir, at
http://www.achp.gov/casearchive/cases6-00SD1.html (last visited
Mar. 21, 2001). After the court entered its order on the NAGPRA is-
sue, the Yankton Sioux Tribe requested Council involvement. The
Corps acknowledged that drawing down the reservoir is an under-
taking for purposes of the NHPA, but concluded that the cemetery
was not eligible for the National Register. The SHPO has not con-
curred in this determination and has requested additional documen-
tation. Id.
137. See 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C), ELR Stat. NEPA §102(2)(C); section
II.A.1, supra (discussing requirements of NHPA §106).
138. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 19
ELR 20743 (1989). The agency should, however, identify the envi-
ronmentally preferable alternative in its NEPA analysis, defined as
the one that “causes the least damage to the biological and physical
environment [and] best protects, preserves, and enhances historic,
cultural, and natural resources.” See Forty Most Asked Questions
Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations,
46 Fed. Reg. 18026, 18028 (Mar. 23, 1981) (Question 6a).
icies include using “all practicable means” to preserve “im-
portant historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national
heritage,” and to maintain “an environment which supports
diversity and variety of individual choice.”139 Effects that
must be considered include “ecological, aesthetic, historic,
cultural, economic, social, or health, whether direct, indi-
rect, or cumulative.”140
Guidance documents issued by the Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ) provide that NEPA analyses must
consider effects on minority and low income populations in
accordance with Executive Order No. 12898 on environ-
mental justice.141 The Executive Order provides that each
federal agency shall, “to the greatest extent practicable and
permitted by law . . . make achieving environmental justice
part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as appro-
priate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activi-
ties on minority populations and low-income popula-
tions . . . .”142 The Executive Order explicitly includes Amer-
ican Indians within its scope.143 Other guidance documents
specify that impacts to unique cultural resources of popula-
tions covered by the Executive Order must be considered
through NEPA.144
In addition, Executive Order No. 13007 on sacred sites
encourages agencies to “protect and preserve Indian reli-
gious practices” by accommodating the access and use of
sacred sites and by avoiding actions that would adversely af-
fect the physical integrity of sacred sites.145 NEPA is an ap-
propriate tool for preserving and accommodating the use of
sacred sites. Although both the sacred sites order and the en-
vironmental justice order expressly state that they create no
legal rights or remedies,146 a failure to consider effects on sa-
cred sites and environmental justice through NEPA, as pro-
vided in the relevant guidance documents, could arguably
be set aside as arbitrary and capricious.147
IV. Public Lands Statutes
The federal public lands are governed not only by NEPA and
the cultural resource protection statutes discussed above,
but each category of public lands is also subject to its own
management mandates. The Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) and National Forest System lands are governed by
multiple use sustained yield principles pursuant to FLPMA
and the NFMA, respectively, while the National Park Ser-
vice Organic Act provides for conservation and enjoyment
of park resources. Although decisions to accommodate
American Indian cultural and religious resources on the
public lands have been subject to a variety of challenges,
each of the relevant statutory schemes allows for cultural re-
source protection as an appropriate component of the
agency’s overall mission, and each provides for integration
with the cultural objectives of NEPA, ARPA, the NHPA,
and NAGPRA.
A. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act
FLPMA was enacted to coordinate over a century’s worth of
piecemeal, disjointed statutes and executive orders govern-
ing the public lands and resources, and to declare that the
public lands would be retained in federal ownership unless it
was determined, after following extensive planning proce-
dures, that disposal would serve the national public inter-
est.148 The statute provides for land acquisition, sale and
withdrawal, roads and rights-of-way, and the processing of
mining claims,149 and establishes a comprehensive manage-
ment scheme for public lands managed by the BLM.150
FLPMA requires the BLM to recognize and balance a va-
riety of “interests as diverse as the lands themselves . . . in a
dynamic, evolving manner.”151 It allows for the designation
of special “areas of critical environmental concern” to pro-
tect historic and cultural values.152 Further, FLPMA pro-
vides that “[i]n managing the public lands, the Secretary [of
the Interior] shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any ac-
tion necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degrada-
tion of the lands.”153 This provision is most frequently raised
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139. 42 U.S.C. §4331(b)(4), ELR Stat. NEPA §101(b)(4).
140. 40 C.F.R. §1508.8 (emphasis added).
141. See CEQ, Environmental Justice Guidance Under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (1997), available at
http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/regs/ej/ej.pdf (last visited Mar. 21,
2001). The CEQ guidance states that “[a]gencies should recognize
the interrelated cultural . . . factors that may amplify the environ-
mental and physical effects of the proposed agency action.” Id. at 9.
In addition, agencies should seek tribal representation during the
NEPA process in a manner consistent with the government-to-gov-
ernment relationship, the federal trust responsibility, and treaty
rights. Id.
142. Exec. Order No. 12898 §1-101, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994),
Admin. Mat. 45075. The order further directs each federal agency
to develop its own agencywide environmental justice strategy. Id.
§1-103.
143. See id. §6-606, Admin. Mat. at 45077 (“Each Federal agency re-
sponsibility set forth under this order shall apply equally to Native
American programs.”).
144. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Interim
Final Guidance for Incorporating Environmental Justice
Concerns in EPA’s NEPA Compliance Analysis §2.2.2
(1997), available at http://es.epa.gov/oeca/ofa/ejepa.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 21, 2001). The EPA guidance explains that “potential ef-
fects to on- or off-reservation tribal resources (e.g., treaty-protected
resources, cultural resources and/or sacred sites) may disproportion-
ately affect the local Native American community and implicate the
federal trust responsibility to tribes.” Id. §2.1.1.
145. Exec. Order No. 13007 §1(a), 61 Fed. Reg. 26771 (May 29, 1996).
146. See id. §4; Exec. Order No. 12898 §6-609, Admin. Mat. at 45077.
The sacred sites order also states that it may not “be construed to im-
pair enforceable rights to use of Federal lands that have been granted
to third parties through final agency action.” Exec. Order No. 13007
§3, 61 Fed. Reg. at 26772.
147. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 13 ELR 20672, 20676 (1983).
But see Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise v. Dalton, 48 F. Supp. 2d
582, 604, 29 ELR 21340, 21347-48 (E.D. Va. 1999) (rejecting NEPA
challenge on ground that court could not review environmental jus-
tice issue pursuant to its express terms: “[t]his order shall not be con-
strued to create any right to judicial review”), aff’d, 217 F.3d 838
(4th Cir. 2000). Compare Exec. Order No. 13007 §4, 61 Fed. Reg. at
26772 (stating that it does not “create any right . . . enforceable at law
or equity by any party against the United States”).
148. See 43 U.S.C. §1701(a), ELR Stat. FLPMA §§102(a).
149. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§1713-1721, ELR Stat. FLPMA §§203-211
(land acquisition and disposition); id. §1744, ELR Stat. FLPMA
§314 (recordation of mining claims), id. §§1761-1770, ELR Stat.
FLPMA §§501-510 (rights-of-way).
150. See id. §1702(c), ELR Stat. FLPMA §103(c) (defining “multi-
ple use”).
151. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 738, 13
ELR 20038, 20039 (10th Cir. 1982).
152. See 43 U.S.C. §§1702(a), 1712(c)(3), ELR Stat. FLPMA §§103(a),
202(c).
153. Id. §1732(b), ELR Stat. FLPMA §302(b) (emphasis added).
in the context of disturbances to natural resources due to ex-
tractive activities like grazing and mining. However, BLM
regulations governing surface disturbances for mining have
long defined “unnecessary or undue degradation” by focus-
ing only on the “unnecessary” prong: “surface disturbances
greater than what would normally result when an activity is
being accomplished by a prudent operator in usual, custom-
ary, and proficient operations of similar character. . . .”154
This narrow interpretation reflects the long-standing federal
policy of encouraging hard-rock mining on public lands un-
der the 1872 General Mining Act, which allows citizens to
locate mining claims by making a discovery of a valuable
mineral deposit on federal lands “open to location.”155
Signaling that change was afoot, a 1999 Solicitor’s Opin-
ion on the Regulation of Hard Rock Mining (Solicitor’s
Opinion) noted that “the conjunction ‘or’ between ‘unnec-
essary’ and ‘undue’ speaks of a secretarial authority to ad-
dress separate types of degradation. . . .”156 Subsequently, in
November 2000, the regulatory definition of “unnecessary
and undue degradation” was amended to clarify that the
term “undue” has independent meaning: “operators must
not cause substantial irreparable harm to significant re-
sources that cannot be effectively mitigated.”157 The revised
regulations are prospective in nature, in that they do not ap-
ply to most ongoing mining operations.158
The Solicitor’s Opinion arose in the context of a proposed
plan of operations submitted by Glamis Corporation for its
Imperial Mine Project, a cyanide heap-leach gold mine on
land administered by the BLM El Centro district in the Cali-
fornia Desert Conservation Area Act (CDCA).159 Under the
BLM’s management plan for the CDCA, the affected area is
designated for limited use, “giving priority to the protection
of sensitive natural, scenic, ecological and cultural re-
sources.”160 The project would affect sites holding religious
and cultural significance for three federally recognized
tribes, the Quechan Tribe, the Colorado River Indian Tribe,
and the Ft. Mojave Indian Tribe.161 The final EIS states that
the area is a place of solitude for the Quechan, “where reli-
gious practitioners came to seek knowledge and spiritual
power.”162 The Council reviewed the proposal pursuant to
the NHPA, concluding that the mine would destroy the his-
toric resources of the project area and that mitigation mea-
sures proposed by the mining company would not compen-
sate for the devastating impacts on traditional religious and
cultural values.163 The Council recommended that the
BLM take whatever legal means available to deny ap-
proval for the project.164
The Solicitor’s Opinion, upon review of the Council’s
recommendations, concluded that the BLM is not com-
pelled to deny approval for the mine, but rather that it has au-
thority to do so under the “undue impairment” standard of
the CDCA.165 The final EIS for the project ultimately desig-
nated the “no action” alternative, i.e., denial of the com-
pany’s proposed plan of operations, as the preferred alterna-
tive.166 The record of decision, issued by then-Secretary
Babbitt in January 2001, denied Glamis’ plan on the
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154. 43 C.F.R. §3809.0-5(k).
155. 30 U.S.C. §§22, et seq. See also 43 U.S.C. §1701(a)(12), ELR Stat.
FLPMA §102(a)(12) (stating congressional intent that the “public
lands be managed in a manner which recognizes the Nation’s need
for domestic sources of minerals”). Section 22 of the Mining Law
explicitly states that the public lands are open to exploration “under
regulations prescribed by law,” and provides for the application of
local mining customs and rules “so far as . . . not inconsistent with the
laws of the United States.” 30 U.S.C. §22.
156. Memorandum from the U.S. DOI, Office of the Solicitor, to Secre-
tary Babbitt and the Acting Director, BLM (Dec. 27, 1999), avail-
able at http://www5.ca.blm.gov/ads-cgi/viewer.pl/pdfdocs/glamis/
Glamis_ROD_final_1- 01.pdf (app. B) The Secretary concurred
with the opinion on January 3, 2000. Id. at 19.
157. Final Rule: Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws, 65 Fed.
Reg. 69998, 70001 (Nov. 21, 2000) (emphasis added). The revised
regulations define “unnecessary or undue degradation” as “condi-
tions, activities, or practices” that fail to comply with performance
standards, terms of an approved plan of operations or other federal
and state laws related to environmental and cultural resource protec-
tion or reclamation, or that result in “substantial irreparable harm to
significant scientific, cultural, or environmental resource values of
the public lands that cannot be effectively mitigated.” Id. at 70115 (to
be codified at 43 C.F.R §3809.5). See also http://www.ca.blm.gov/
news/ 3809finalrule_nr11-00.html (press release discussing revised
3809 regulations) (last visited Mar. 21, 2001).
158. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 69998 (providing an effective date of Jan. 20,
2001); id. at 70038 (stating that “any plan of operations submitted
prior to the effective date of the final regulations would be able to use
the plan content requirements and performance standards in the pre-
vious regulations”). The National Mining Association and the state
of Nevada have challenged the new regulations, see Christian
Bourge, Court Allows Mining Changes to Take Effect, Am. Metal
Market, 2001 WL 8177009, Jan. 23, 2001, at 6, and the Bush Ad-
ministration has proposed to suspend them altogether. See 66 Fed.
Reg. 16162, 16164 (Mar. 23, 2001).
159. See 64 Fed. Reg. 8398 (Feb. 19, 1999); Press Release, Final EIS/EIR
for Imperial Project Gold Mine Available, at http://www.ca.blm.
gov/news/glamis_imperial_final_eis.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2001). A plan of operations is required by the §3809 regulations. See
43 C.F.R. §3809.1-4.
160. See Record of Decision for the Imperial Project Gold Mine Proposal
13 (Jan. 17, 2001) [hereinafter Glamis ROD], available at http://
www5.ca.blm.gov/ads-cgi/viewer.pl/pdfdocs/glamis/Glamis_ROD_
final_1-01.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2001) (describing Limited Use
category (Multiple Use Class L) as “specifically intended for the
protection of ‘sensitive, natural, scenic, ecological, and cultural re-
source values’ [which] provides for ‘generally lower-intensity, care-
fully controlled multiple use of resources, while ensuring that sensi-
tive values are not significantly diminished’”).
161. See Letter from Courtney Ann Coyle to Douglas Romoli, BLM, Re:
Imperial Project 5-8 (Apr. 12, 1998) (discussing project’s impact on
the Quechan’s sacred landscapes and pathways in the Indian Pass
area, including the Trail of Dreams, used for “religious pilgrimages
associated with the Keruk ceremony, the most important and deeply
religious” of ceremonies) (on file with author). The final EIS states
that the Indian Pass-Running Man area, an Area of Traditional Cul-
tural Concern, should be treated as a significant resource, even
though the “data are insufficient to determine whether the [Area]
should stand alone as a potential TCP, or should be evaluated as part
of a larger complex . . . .” Imperial Project, Final Environmental Im-
pact Statement/Environmental Impact Report (Sept. 2000), at
3.6.2.4, available at http://www5.ca.blm.gov/ads-cgi/viewer.pl/
pdfdocs/imperial/Vol-1_gw.pdf?page=312&mode=sbpsgc100 (last
visited Mar. 21, 2001). A total of 55 sites within and near the project
area have been evaluated as eligible for the National Register. Id. at
3.6.2.1.
162. See Imperial Project, Final Environmental Impact Statement/Envi-
ronmental Impact Report, supra note 161, at 3.6.2.4.
163. See Council Seeks Halt to Proposed Imperial Mine Project, at http://
www.achp.gov/casearchive/newsimperialmine.html (last visited
Mar. 21, 2001).
164. See id.
165. See 16 U.S.C. §1781(f), ELR Stat. FLPMA §601(f) (providing for
regulations to protect scenic, scientific, and environmental values
from “undue impairment”).
166. See Notice of Availability of FEIS, 65 Fed. Reg. 67396 (Nov. 7,
2000); Press Release, supra note 159 (describing “no action” as the
BLM’s preferred alternative “based on the finding that the com-
pany’s proposed action, even with the application of additional miti-
gation measures, would result in significant adverse impacts to Na-
tive American archeological and cultural resources considered sa-
cred to the Quechan Indian Tribe and other sensitive resources”).
grounds that the mine and associated facilities would cause
unavoidable harm to cultural, historic, and visual resources,
and that negative impacts would outweigh the economic
benefits of the project.167 The decision is the first time that
the development of perfected mining claims has been de-
nied under FLPMA and the CDCA.168 Although the deci-
sion is entitled to deference as a reasonable interpretation of
the two statutes,169 and appears to be on solid ground both
with respect to statutory and constitutional requirements,
Glamis has filed suit, alleging violations of FLPMA, the
CDCA, and the Establishment Clause.170
B. The National Forest Management Act
The lands within the National Forest System are managed
pursuant to the NFMA and its predecessors, the Forest Ser-
vice Organic Act of 1897171 and the Multiple-Use Sus-
tained-Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA).172 These enactments
require that national forests be managed for multiple uses of
forest resources, including watersheds, timber, fish and
wildlife, range, recreation, and wilderness, while maintain-
ing the resources without impairment of productivity “in
perpetuity.”173 MUSYA directs the Forest Service to make
the “most judicious use of the land for some or all of the re-
sources,” in a manner that allows it to “conform to changing
needs and conditions.”174 It further specifies that “some land
will be used for less than all of the resources” and calls for
“harmonious and coordinated management of the various
resources . . . with consideration being given to the[ir] rela-
tive values.”175 To effectuate these directives, the NFMA es-
tablishes comprehensive planning and public participation
requirements, and requires that forest uses be consistent
with land and resource management plans.176
Regulations governing Forest Service activities provide
that cultural resources should play a key role in the manage-
ment of the national forests. Specifically, “physical, biologi-
cal, economic, and social effects,” including the preserva-
tion of cultural resource values, must be considered during
the planning process.177 Regional plans and forest plans are
to be based on multiple use sustained yield principles, in-
cluding “[p]reservation of important historic, cultural, and
natural aspects of our national heritage [and] protection and
preservation of the inherent right of freedom of American
Indians to believe, express, and exercise their traditional re-
ligions . . . .”178 The regulations provide detailed require-
ments for the identification and protection of “significant
cultural resources” on national forests.179 The evaluation of
planning alternatives must satisfy NEPA and the NHPA and
must be coordinated with the SHPO.180 Consultation with
tribes is also required to ensure that treaty and trust re-
sources are identified early on in the decisionmaking pro-
cess and that tribal information, suggestions, and concerns
are considered.181
The Forest Service has issued several recent decisions to
protect tribal cultural resources pursuant to the NFMA and
the NHPA. For example, it has precluded oil and gas leasing
along the Rocky Mountain Front Range within the Lewis
and Clark National Forest in order to protect the “value and
spirituality of place,” including aesthetic and social values
and Blackfeet sacred sites.182 A Montana district court re-
jected constitutional and statutory claims brought by indus-
try groups in Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass’n v. U.S. Forest
Service, finding that the decision utilized valid manage-
ment criteria for protecting “the pristine scenery and di-
verse resources” of the area.183 An appeal to the Ninth Cir-
cuit is pending.184
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167. See Glamis ROD, supra note 160. Glamis claims the mine would
yield 1.1 million ounces of gold worth $300 million. See Babbitt
Kills Bid to Dig Gold Mine Near Indian Sacred Sites, L.A. Times,
Jan. 18, 2001, at A16.
168. Babbitt Kills Bid to Dig Gold Mine Near Indian Sacred Sites, supra
note 167.
169. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984). See also Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1 (1965) (deferring to agency interpretation of regulations and
secretarial orders).
170. Glamis Imperial Corp. v. Department of the Interior, No.
1:01CV00530 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2001). Glamis had previously filed a
lawsuit challenging the Solicitor’s Opinion, but it was dismissed for
lack of final agency action. Glamis Imperial Corp. v. Babbitt, No. 00
CV 1934W (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2000). Except for possible Fifth
Amendment takings claims, which are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, relevant constitutional provisions are addressed below, see infra
section V.B. (discussing the First Amendment).
171. See 16 U.S.C. §§473-482, 551.
172. See id. §§528-531.
173. See id. §§475 (providing for establishment of national forests to se-
cure water flows and timber supply), 528 (providing for recreation,
range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, as well as for mineral re-
sources), 529 (providing for wilderness), and 1604(e) (incorporating
uses specified in 16 U.S.C. §§528-529).
174. Id. §531(a).
175. Id.
176. See id. §1604(i).
177. 36 C.F.R. §219.12 (2000). See 7 C.F.R. §3100.43(a) (stating that the
“Department of Agriculture is committed to the manage-
ment—identification, protection, preservation, interpretation, eval-
uation and nomination—of our prehistoric and historic cultural re-
sources for the benefit of all people of this and future generations”).
178. 36 C.F.R. §219.1(b)(5)-(6) (2000).
179. See id. §219.24 (2000) (requiring planning “for the protection of sig-
nificant cultural resources from vandalism and other human depre-
dation, and natural destruction”). See also id. §219.27(b)(1) (2000)
(requiring management measures so that vegetative manipulation
shall be “best suited to the multiple-use goals established for the
area, considering potential environmental, economic and cultural re-
source impacts”). Recently published revisions to the regulations
continue to recognize cultural needs and values in forest planning.
See Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 67514, 67550, 67558 (Nov. 9, 2000).
180. See 36 C.F.R. §219.24 (2000). See also 65 Fed. Reg. at 67573, to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.21 (social and economic sustainability).
181. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 67573, to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.15 (inter-
action with American Indian tribes and Alaska Natives). See also 36
C.F.R. §219.1(b)(9) (2000) (requiring that forest plans be coordi-
nated with “other Federal agencies, State and local governments,
and Indian tribes”); 7 C.F.R. §3100.43(d) (stating that the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture “is committed to consideration of the needs
of American Indians, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians in the
practice of their traditional religions”).
182. See Independent Petroleum Ass’n of Am. v. U.S. Forest Serv., at
http://www.mountainstateslegal.org/legal_cases_category_home.
cfm?casecategoryid=2 (last visited Mar. 21, 2001); Sherry Devlin,
429,000 Acres Closed to Hard Rock Mining, Missoulian, Feb. 4,
1999, at A1; Tom Laceky, Red Tape Seals Off Sacred Lands, L.A.
Times, Oct. 19, 1997, at B1. The agency has also withdrawn areas of
the Rocky Mountain Front Range from hard-rock mining in consid-
eration of traditional uses by American Indians, and to protect en-
dangered species and roadless values. See Public Land Order No.
7480, 66 Fed. Reg. 6657 (Jan. 22, 2001); Final EIS on Decision to
Withdraw Front Range, at http://www.fs.fed.us/r1/lewisclark (last
visited Mar. 21, 2001).
183. No. 98-22-H-CCL, Opinion and Order at 5-6 (D. Mont., Mar. 7,
2000); Steve Davies, Judge Upholds Decision Not to Open Forest to
Natural Gas Leasing, Inside Energy, Mar. 13, 2000, at 17. The
court dismissed the constitutional Establishment Clause claim for
The agency is also facing a challenge to the Bighorn Na-
tional Forest’s Historic Preservation Plan for the Medicine
Wheel, a sacred site and national historic landmark. The
plan requires consultation with tribes before logging and
other activities that might harm the spiritual value of the site,
and closes a road within the viewshed of the Medicine
Wheel.185 In Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Ser-
vice,186 the plaintiff, a commercial logging company, alleges
that the Forest Service has given the tribe “veto power”
within the 18,000-acre area of consultation, thereby inhibit-
ing economic opportunities and establishing a religion in vi-
olation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment.187 Briefs have been filed in the district of Wyoming.188
The NFMA, the NHPA, and other relevant statutes and
regulations provide ample authority to withdraw portions of
the National Forest System lands from mineral leasing and
to declare some areas unsuitable for timber harvest in order
to protect aesthetic and cultural resources. The NFMA spe-
cifically provides that some land may be used “for less than
all of the [MUSYA] resources” in order to ensure
sustainability as well as “harmonious and coordinated man-
agement” of the various resources, given their relative val-
ues.189 So long as the decisions regarding the Rocky Moun-
tain Front Range and the Medicine Wheel are consistent
with the relevant forest plans, and are well-documented, ra-
tional, and based on a thorough consideration of relevant
data, they should withstand statutory review.190 Further, the
decisions will likely survive constitutional scrutiny, as dis-
cussed below.191
C. The National Park Service Organic Act
NPS properties are managed pursuant to the National Park
Service Organic Act “to conserve the scenery and the natu-
ral and historic objects and the wild life therein and to pro-
vide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations.”192 Congress’ purpose in establishing
the National Park System was clarified in subsequent
amendments: “These areas, though distinct in character, are
united through their inter-related purposes and resources
into one national park system as cumulative expressions of a
single national heritage. . . .”193
In addition to the National Park Service Organic Act, in-
dividual units of the National Park System each have their
own legislative directive. Several protect historic Christian
churches.194 Some specifically acknowledge and protect the
integrity of, and American Indian access to, sacred sites and
cultural properties.195
NPS regulations and policies proclaim duties to conserve
and to avoid impairment of park resources and values.196
Park resources and values include, among other things, “ar-
cheological resources; cultural landscapes; ethnographic
resources; [and] historic and prehistoric sites, structures and
objects.”197 Impacts that would harm the integrity of park re-
sources or values are prohibited.198 An impact is likely to
constitute an impairment “to the extent that it affects a re-
source or value whose conservation is . . . key to the natural
or cultural integrity of the park or to opportunities for enjoy-
ment of the park. . . .”199 The superintendent of an individual
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failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Opinion and Order,
supra, at 6 n.2.
184. See http://www.mountainstateslegal.org/press_releases.cfm?press
releaseid=66 (last visited Mar. 21, 2001).
185. See Historic Preservation Plan for the Medicine Wheel, su-
pra note 66; section II.A.1., supra (discussing the NHPA’s provi-
sions for national historic landmarks).
186. No. 99-CV-031J (D. Wyo. Feb. 16, 1999). See http://www.mountain
stateslegal.org/legal_cases.cfm?legalcaseid=44 (last visited Mar.
21, 2001).
187. See Pauline Arrillaga, Sacred Indian Sites Pit Almighty Buck Against
Almighty Logging, L.A. Times, July 23, 2000, B1.
188. See id.
189. 16 U.S.C. §531(a). See 16 U.S.C. §1604(k) (directing that some
lands may be identified as unsuitable for timber production due to
“physical, economic, and other pertinent factors”); id. §551 (requir-
ing regulations to preserve the forests from destruction due to min-
ing). Prohibitions on hard-rock mining, however, raise more difficult
issues. See id. §428 (requiring that no rule or regulation prohibit
“proper and lawful purposes, including that of prospecting, locating
and developing the mineral resources”); United States v. Weiss, 642
F.2d 296, 11 ELR 20512 (9th Cir.1981) (“Secretary may adopt rea-
sonable rules and regulations which do not impermissibly encroach
upon the right to use and enjoyment of . . . claims for mining pur-
poses”); United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1106, 30 ELR
20278 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Weiss, and stating that use of national
forest lands by miners may be regulated “only to the extent that the
regulations are ‘reasonable’ and do not impermissibly encroach on
legitimate uses incident to mining and mill site claims”).
190. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 13 ELR 20672, 20676 (1983).
191. See infra, section V (discussing the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, as well as equal protection principles).
192. 16 U.S.C. §1.
193. Id. §1a-1. See 36 C.F.R. pts. 1-59 (NPS regulations).
194. The National Park System includes San Antonio Missions National
Historical Park, see 16 U.S.C.A. §410ee (establishing the park and
authorizing cooperative management agreements with the Catholic
Archdiocese), as well as Christ Church, an Episcopal Church in
Boston, and St. Joseph’s Catholic Church in Philadelphia, see
Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring the Establish-
ment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 Ariz.
L. Rev. 1291, 1317 (1996). In addition, there are chapels in numer-
ous parks, including the Grand Canyon, Yellowstone, and Yosem-
ite. Id.
195. See, e.g., California Desert Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §410aaa-75(a)
(recognizing that Indian people long utilized areas of the desert for
traditional purposes, and directing the Secretary to ensure access by
authorizing temporary closures upon request); El Malpais National
Monument and Conservation Area, 16 U.S.C. §460uu-47(c) (autho-
rizing temporary closure “to protect the privacy of religious activi-
ties in such areas by Indian people”); Jemez National Recreational
Area, 16 U.S.C. §460jjj-1 (requiring the Secretary to ensure protec-
tion of Indian “religious and cultural sites” and provide access to
sites for traditional uses); Zuni-Cibola National Historic Park, 16
U.S.C. §410pp-4, pp-6 (establishing a Zuni-Cibola advisory com-
mittee to guide park management and authorizing the Secretary,
upon request, to temporarily close areas “to protect the privacy of re-
ligious activities by Indian people”).
196. See 36 C.F.R. §§2.1(a) (prohibiting the possession, destruction or
disturbance of various natural resources, including cultural or ar-
chaeological resources); 1.5(a) (listing protection of cultural values,
subsistence uses and species conservation as factors to consider
in issuing closures or use restrictions). See also 2001 NPS Man-
agement Policies 1.4, available at http://www.nps.gov/refdesk/
mp/index.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2001) (replacing Director’s Order
No. 55: Interpreting the NPS Organic Act (Sept. 8, 2000) (on file
with author)).
197. NPS Management Policies §1.4.6. See id. ch. 5 (cultural resource
management); Director’s Order No. 28, at http://www.nps.gov/
refdesk/DOrders/DOrder28.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2001).
198. NPS Management Policies §1.4.4. See id. §5.3.5 (committing to “the
long- term preservation of, public access to, and appreciation of, the
features, materials, and qualities contributing to the significance of
cultural resources”).
199. Id. §1.4.5. See 36 C.F.R. §2.1 (providing for the preservation of cul-
tural and archaeological resources).
park unit may order a closure or restrict the use of an area to
protect natural or cultural resources.200
Given the central role that the National Park System plays
in our national heritage, it is no surprise that NPS decisions
affecting American Indian interests within national parks
and monuments have been highly controversial. NPS deci-
sions to protect sacred sites and accommodate traditional
practices have triggered a variety of challenges from
non-Indian users of the public lands.
In Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt,201 the dis-
trict court dismissed claims by commercial climbers who
had challenged the Climbing Management Plan for Devils
Tower National Monument.202 The tower, known in Sioux
lore as Mato tipi paha, or Bear Lodge Hill, has tremendous
significance to many tribes as a highly important pilgrimage
site for Sun Dances and Vision Quests, both of which re-
quire solemnity and solitude.203 The district court held that
the plan, which provides for a voluntary climbing closure
during the month of June to accommodate religious and cul-
tural practices of northern plains tribes, and the posting of
signs advising visitors of the tribes’ values, did not violate
the regulatory provisions regarding closures.204 Further, it
determined that the plan satisfied the Establishment Clause,
as it had the secular purpose of removing barriers and ac-
commodating American Indian religious practices, it was
not coercive and did not advance or endorse religion, and
there was no excessive entanglement with tribal worship.205
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the complaint on
the grounds that the climbers lacked standing to challenge
the plan.206
Similar claims have been asserted in Natural Bridge &
Arch Society v. National Park Service,207 a challenge to the
Management Plan for Rainbow Bridge National Monu-
ment. The complaint alleges that the Establishment Clause
is violated by a decision to post signs requesting that visitors
respect the “long-standing beliefs” of American Indian
tribes by not approaching or walking under the bridge, a
278-foot natural arch held sacred by five tribes.208 Accord-
ing to the plaintiff, although the signs request “voluntary
compliance,” visitors who approach the site are threatened
with arrest if they step off a trail, but the trail itself has been
concealed with boulders.209 The government disputes the al-
legations, and the parties’ dispositive motions are pending
before a district court in Utah.210
Cultural disputes over park resources are not limited to
the access and use of sacred lands. The NPS is currently en-
gaged in a controversial decisionmaking process regarding
the collection of golden eagle chicks at Wupatki National
Monument, an area historically used by the Hopi Tribe. A
proposed rule would allow the Hopi to gather eaglets, con-
sidered messengers between the physical and spiritual
worlds, so that they may be reared and sacrificed for cere-
monial purposes.211 The proposal has been criticized as
opening the door to hunting in the parks, a practice gener-
ally prohibited,212 although permits may be granted in cer-
tain circumstances.213
The National Park Service Organic Act and its imple-
menting regulations and guidance authorize the protection
and even prioritization of cultural resources and practices in
appropriate cases, particularly where tribes have historic
ties to the lands at issue. If treaty rights specifically provide
for the use of resources on the federal lands, access must be
provided, absent congressional abrogation of the treaty.214
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200. See 36 C.F.R. §§1.5, 13.30.
201. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998), appeal dismissed, 175 F.3d 814,
816, 29 ELR 21083, 21084 (10th Cir. 1999).
202. Id. The district court had previously granted a preliminary injunction
against implementation of an earlier version of the plan that prohib-
ited commercial climbing during June. See Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d
at 1450-51 (finding a likelihood of success on the merits of the Estab-
lishment Clause claim as to a mandatory closure).
203. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 816, 29 ELR at 21084 (citing Romanus
Bear Stops, a traditional leader of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe).
See also Dr. Raymond J. DeMallie, in Gunderson, Devils
Tower: Stories in Stone ix (High Plains Press 1988) (explaining
that the “soaring height of the tower inevitably makes it, in human
perception, a link between earth and sky”).
204. Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1447 (citing NPS Management Policies
§8:9: “Performance of traditional activities . . . will not be a reason
for prohibiting the use of that area by others except where temporary
closings are authorized by law . . . .”). See 36 C.F.R. §§1.5, 13.30
(regulations specifying closure procedures); 2001 NPS Manage-
ment Policies §§8.2, 8.5, available at http://www.nps.gov/refdesk/
mp/index.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2001) (current policies regarding
closures and Native American use).
205. Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1454-56. For detailed discussion of the
Establishment Clause, see infra, section V.B.
206. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 821-22, 29 ELR at 21086. Although the
court did not reach the merits of the claims, it clearly recognized the
importance of the site to American Indian culture and religion. See
id. at 816, 29 ELR at 21084 (citing Romanus Bear Stops).
207. No. 2000CV-0191J (D. Utah Mar. 3, 2000).
208. See Denver Group Claims Park Service Is Promoting Native Ameri-
can Religion, Denver Post, Mar. 8, 2000. The Navajo, Hopi, San
Juan Southern Paiute, Kaibab Paiute, and White Mesa Ute have ex-
pressed an interest in Rainbow Bridge as a traditional sacred site. See
Rainbow Bridge National Monument, at http://www.nps.gov/rabr/
intro.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2001).
209. See Denver Group Claims Park Service Is Promoting Native Ameri-
can Religion, supra note 208.
210. See http://www.mountainstateslegal.org/legal_cases.cfm?legalcase
id’53 (last visited Mar. 21, 2001). Plaintiffs filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment on January 31, 2001, and the government responded
on February 14. Id.
211. See Proposed Rule: Religious Ceremonial Collection of Golden Ea-
glets From Wupatki National Monument, 66 Fed. Reg. 6516 (Jan.
22, 2001); Mark Shaffer, Hopis Hopeful on Eagle Plan, The Ariz.
Republic, Oct. 31, 2000, at B5.
212. See The Humane Society News: Babbitt Wants to Allow Eagle Taking
on Park Lands, at http://www.hsus.org/whatnew/eagle081400.html
(last visited Mar. 21, 2001). NPS regulations generally prohibit
“possessing, destroying, . . . or disturbing” wildlife, fish or plants, or
the parts or products of any of these items. 36 C.F.R. §2.1(a).
213. See 36 C.F.R. §§2.1(c) (personal use of certain plants and items);
2.5(b) (research). The “taking, use or possession of fish, wildlife or
plants for ceremonial or religious purposes” is only allowed “where
specifically authorized by Federal statutory law, treaty rights, or in
accordance with §2.2 [wildlife protection] or §2.3 [fishing].” Id.
§2.1(d). Pursuant to §2.2(b)(2), hunting may be authorized “where
such activity is specifically authorized as a discretionary activity un-
der Federal statutory law if the superintendent determines that such
activity is consistent with public safety and enjoyment, and sound re-
source management principles.” Id. The Hopi have obtained eagle
collection permits from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service under the
Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §668a. See Environmental Assess-
ment on Proposed Rule 3 (Jan. 2001), at http://www.nps.gov/wupa/
pphtml/facts.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2001).
214. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739, 16 ELR 20676, 20677
(1986) (requiring clear congressional intent to abrogate treaty
rights); NPS Management Policies §8.9 (stating that consumptive
uses must be allowed if authorized by treaties). See also Sandi B.
Zellmer, Indian Lands as Critical Habitat for Indian Nations and
Endangered Species: Tribal Survival and Sovereignty Come First,
43 S.D. L. Rev. 381, 400-05 (1998) (discussing interplay between
wildlife conservation principles and Indian treaty rights).
Otherwise, reasonable and timely closures that allow tradi-
tional ceremonies to take place undisturbed by other visi-
tors, along with other suitably tailored accommodations, are
apt management tools in the preservation and allocation of
park resources.
V. Constitutional Provisions Relevant to Cultural
Resource Protection
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof. . . .”215 Between these two
clauses lies an area of discretion, where federal action is
neither constitutionally required nor forbidden. Providing
for the use of cultural properties that hold religious signifi-
cance for interested parties, particularly American Indian
tribes, comes well within this discretionary window. Al-
though accommodation may not be required by the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, it is generally not prohibited by the Establish-
ment Clause.
A. The Free Exercise of Religion
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from
compelling the affirmation of a religious belief, or penaliz-
ing individuals or groups because of their religious views.216
The freedom to hold religious beliefs has been described as
“absolute,”217 although religious practices may be subject to
regulation. Governmental actions that directly target reli-
gions are typically struck down as failing to satisfy the strict
scrutiny standard required of fundamental rights,218 while
neutral laws of general applicability are tested by less de-
manding standards.
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass’n,219 the Supreme Court rejected a Free Exercise Clause
challenge to a Forest Service decision to build a timber road
through a sacred site.220 The Court held that a governmental
decision having only “incidental” effects on American In-
dian religious practices, severe though those effects may be,
need only have a rational basis.221 Accordingly, because the
agency had a legitimate reason to build the road, and had not
intentionally coerced religious practitioners to violate their
beliefs, it had not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. To
hold otherwise, opined the Court, would impose a “religious
servitude” and “could easily require de facto beneficial
ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public prop-
erty.”222 It concluded that “the diminution of the Govern-
ment’s property rights, and the concomitant subsidy of the
Indian religion would in this case be far from trivial . . . .”223
The Court also rejected claims based on the American
Religious Freedom Act of 1979 (AIRFA).224 AIRFA voices
the federal policy of protecting American Indians’ “inherent
right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise . . . tradi-
tional religions . . . , including but not limited to access to
sites, use and possession of sacred objects. . . .”225 Citing the
bill’s sponsor, the Court found that AIRFA created no le-
gally enforceable rights.226
Subsequently, in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith,227 the Supreme Court held that
the Free Exercise Clause did not forbid Oregon from either
banning sacramental peyote use through general criminal
prohibitions or denying unemployment benefits to practi-
tioners terminated from their jobs for peyote use.228 The
Court unequivocally specified that neutral laws of general
applicability need only be supported by a rational basis,
even where such laws could destroy the central tenets of
a religion.229
A few years after Smith was handed down, Congress at-
tempted to restore the compelling interest test in all cases
where governmental action substantially burdens religion
by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).230 In City of Boerne v. Flores,231 the Court held that
Congress’ attempt to prescribe a legal standard for analyz-
ing Free Exercise Clause claims exceeded its authority to
enforce the law under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment:
“Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause.”232
By its own terms, the Fourteenth Amendment applies
only to the states, leaving some question as to whether
RFRA may have continuing force as applied to federal ac-
tions.233 Congress has since amended RFRA to limit its
scope to federal action by omitting references to state and
NEWS & ANALYSIS
Copyright © 2001 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
6-2001 31 ELR 10703
215. U.S. Const. amend. I.
216. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
217. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
218. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeh, 508 U.S. 520 (1993);
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (concluding that the disqualification of a
Sabbatarian from receiving unemployment benefits because of her
refusal to work on Saturday did not satisfy the compelling interest
test); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 219 (1972) (finding
that a compulsory education law that would “gravely endanger”
Amish religious beliefs did not satisfy strict scrutiny).
219. 485 U.S. 439, 18 ELR 21043 (1988).
220. Id. at 454-55, 18 ELR at 21046-47.
221. Id. at 450-51, 18 ELR at 21045 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693
(1986)).
222. Id. at 452-53, 18 ELR at 21046.
223. Id. at 453, 18 ELR at 21046.
224. Id. at 454, 18 ELR at 21046-47 (citing 42 U.S.C. §1996).
225. 42 U.S.C. §1996.
226. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455, 18 ELR at 21047 (citing statement of Rep.
Morris Udall (D-Ariz.), the Act “has no teeth”). See also Conserva-
tion Law Found. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 216 F.3d
41, 50, 30 ELR 20693, 20696 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that AIRFA
calls upon federal agencies to consider, but not necessarily to defer
to, Indian religious values).
227. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
228. Id. at 883-85.
229. Id. at 883-86.
230. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(1).
231. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
232. Id. at 516, 519. Section 5 provides: “The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Four-
teenth Amendment].” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §5. The Court con-
cluded that the enforcement power of §5 allows Congress to preserve
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment but does not allow it
to go beyond the Court’s authoritative interpretation of those rights.
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
233. Compare U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §§1, 5 with U.S. Const.
amend. V, which has no parallel enforcement clause. See Thomas C.
Berg, The Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Legislation,
20 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 715, 728 (1998). Several circuit
courts have concluded that RFRA is constitutional as applied to fed-
eral law. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 811 (1998) (holding RFRA continues to apply to federal
bankruptcy laws); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192
F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir.1999) (finding that the application of federal
copyright laws did not violate RFRA).
local governments.234 If RFRA, as limited to federal actions,
should survive constitutional scrutiny, decisions that inci-
dentally but substantially affect religious beliefs by restrict-
ing access to public lands, or by altering the landscape such
that religious practices would be destroyed, would be sub-
ject to strict scrutiny. Logging, grazing, road-building, and
other discretionary activities may be legitimate uses of pub-
lic lands, but they pale in comparison to American Indian re-
ligious interests and “fall far short of constituting the ‘para-
mount interests’ necessary to justify infringement of plain-
tiffs’ freedom of religion.”235
B. The Establishment Clause
Although the Establishment Clause prevents either the
church or the state from invading the prerogatives of the
other, “‘total separation is not possible in an absolute sense.
Some relationship between government and religious orga-
nizations is inevitable.’”236 Governments are prohibited
from singling out religious organizations for preferred treat-
ment,237 but the Establishment Clause does not condone cal-
lous indifference to religious needs.238 Governments “may
(and sometimes must) accommodate religious prac-
tices and . . . may do so without violating the Establish-
ment Clause.”239
In resolving Establishment Clause challenges, courts
generally apply the three-pronged Lemon v. Kurtzman240
test: (1) whether the activity has a secular purpose; (2)
whether its primary effect is the advancement of religion;
and (3) whether the activity constitutes an excessive entan-
glement with religion. These factors are not rigidly applied,
but are viewed as useful tools in resolving the ultimate issue:
whether the activity, in reality, establishes or endorses a reli-
gion or religious faith.241 In analyzing an Establishment
Clause issue, courts should consider all the circumstances of
a particular case, such as historic circumstances, special re-
lationships, and the location of the activity.242
The accommodation of American Indian sacred sites and
TCPs is unlikely to offend Establishment Clause principles,
given the unique context of the government’s relationship
with, and responsibilities toward, federally recognized
tribes. In Lyng, the Supreme Court encouraged federal agen-
cies to accommodate American Indian religious practices
on public lands even if not required to do so under the Free
Exercise Clause.243 Lyng is not necessarily binding in the
Establishment Clause context; however, it is consistent with
the long-standing principle that accommodations for feder-
ally recognized Indian tribes are permissible political, not
racial or religious, distinctions.
In Morton v. Mancari,244 the Court held that Bureau of In-
dian Affairs hiring preferences for American Indians were
based on a permissible political distinction, the special trust
relationship between the federal government and Indian
tribes. As such, the program was subject to rational basis re-
view, a threshold that it easily surpassed. Following Morton,
several circuit courts have held that the government need
only demonstrate a rational relationship to a legitimate in-
terest to satisfy the Establishment Clause when accommo-
dations are made for federally recognized tribes, given their
unique legal and political status.245
Fulfillment of the government’s trust responsibility and
alleviating burdens imposed by federal land ownership and
past governmental policies are secular political purposes,
with the secular effect of promoting tribal sovereignty.
Many statutes demonstrate the federal government’s secular
political purposes in protecting tribal culture and sover-
eignty.246 Some, like the NHPA, specifically advance the
policy of accommodating cultural practices and protecting
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234. See Pub. L. No. 106-274, §7(a)(1), 114 Stat. 806 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §2000bb-2) (Sept. 22, 2000) (defining “government” as a
“branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official . . . of the
United States, or of a covered entity,” and striking the reference to “a
State, or a subdivision of a State”).
235. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 565 F.
Supp. 586, 596, 13 ELR 20793, 20796 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (quoting
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)), aff’d in relevant part,
764 F.2d 581, 15 ELR 20682 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d sub nom., Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 18 ELR
21043 (1988).
236. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (citing Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
237. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2487
(1994) (plurality opinion); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968).
238. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (“Such hostility would bring us into ‘war
with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment’s
guaranty of the free exercise of religion.’”) (citing McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-212 (1948)).
239. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45
(1987)).
240. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
241. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
242. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614; Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982);
Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991).
243. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S.
439, 454-55, 18 ELR 21043, 21046-47 (1988). The Court noted
with approval the many “ameliorative” measures taken by the For-
est Service to minimize impacts on tribal interests. Id. at 454, 18
ELR at 21043. The Tenth Circuit took a different view in a pre-Lyng
Free Exercise Clause case, stating in dicta that a decision to exclude
all non-Indian visitors from a national monument, or to allow reli-
gious practitioners to control the use of the monument, would vio-
late the Establishment Clause. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d
172, 179, 11 ELR 20204 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
954 (1981).
244. 417 U.S. 551-52, 555 (1974). The Morton rationale applies to fed-
eral actions that affect unique interests of federally recognized
tribes, such as self-governance, tribal lands, and cultural interests.
See Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000); Williams v. Babbitt,
115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997). See also Washington v. Confederated
Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979)
(“It is settled that ‘the unique legal status of Indian tribes under fed-
eral law’ permits the Federal Government to enact legislation sin-
gling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be constitu-
tionally offensive.”).
245. See Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st
Cir. 1992) (upholding exemption for tribal members from prohibi-
tion on possession of eagle feathers); Peyote Way Church of God v.
Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding Native Amer-
ican Church exemption from prohibition on use of peyote). See also
Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448,
1454-56 (D. Wyo. 1998) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge
to Devils Tower Climbing Management Plan, discussed supra at
note 205).
246. See 16 U.S.C. §470f; 36 C.F.R. §60.4. See also 25 U.S.C. §3601 (de-
claring U.S. government-to-government relationship with tribes and
responsibilities to protect tribal sovereignty, and noting the impor-
tance of tribal culture to effectuating tribal sovereignty); id. §2901
(proclaiming U.S. responsibility for ensuring the survival of Ameri-
can Indian cultures); id. §2001(c)(2) (directing that educational stan-
dards take into account the “specific cultural heritage of each tribe”);
id. §1901 (noting the importance of cultural standards of American
Indian communities and families to tribal integrity).
sacred sites.247 The fact that accommodations might also in-
cidentally advance religious interests does not require inval-
idation of such actions or policies.248 The Court has upheld
numerous governmental programs that provide incidental
benefits to religious organizations, such as Sunday closing
laws and policies providing open access to public fora for
both religious and nonreligious groups.249
Finally, federal actions that promote or remove impedi-
ments to the access and use of sacred sites do not excessively
entangle the government with American Indian religious
practices or beliefs; instead, such actions simply allow reli-
gious practices to advance themselves uninhibited by gov-
ernment. Entanglement occurs when government action re-
sults in pervasive state surveillance of religious activities250
or a “‘fusion of governmental and religious functions.’”251
Conversely, “[a] law is not unconstitutional because it al-
lows churches to advance religion, which is their very pur-
pose.”252 Removing impediments to the use of govern-
ment-owned sites of cultural and religious importance to
tribes simply effectuates the government’s political and re-
medial purposes, allowing tribes and tribal members to ad-
vance their own beliefs and practices, and does not establish
or endorse a religion.
VI. Conclusion
Together, FLPMA, the NFMA and the National Park Ser-
vice Organic Act, along with the overarching requirements
of the NHPA, NEPA, ARPA and NAGPRA, provide ample
grounds for accommodating cultural interests in public
lands, particularly American Indian traditional cultural
properties. Although accommodation is generally not re-
quired by the Free Exercise Clause in the wake of the Lyng
case, neither is it prohibited by the Establishment Clause.
Further, the protection and accommodation of access to cul-
tural resources are affirmatively encouraged by federal pol-
icy, and perhaps even mandated by RFRA. Reasonable ac-
commodations, tailored to the specific parcel of land and re-
source at issue, and supported by thorough administrative
records showing a responsiveness to the long-term needs of
the resources as well as the public, should withstand consti-
tutional and statutory challenges.
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247. See 16 U.S.C. §470a(d)(6). See also 42 U.S.C. §1996 (adopting pol-
icy “to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right
of freedom to believe, express, and exercise traditional religions . . . ,
including but not limited to access . . . and the freedom to worship
through ceremonials at traditional sites”).
248. See McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1961) (upholding
Sunday closing laws because, although they provided some benefit
to Christian churches and churchgoers, they also advanced secular
goals of promoting public health, safety, and well-being through a
uniform day of rest).
249. See id. at 444-45; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1981).
250. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1971); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997).
251. See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982) (citing
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963)) (invalidating a state statute that delegated power to religious
bodies to veto applications for liquor licenses near churches).
252. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987) (emphasis in orig-
inal). See Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1947) (Establishment Clause prevents state from “participat[ing].”
